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“Although wrongs have been done me I live in hopes.”

The number of states, corporations, and religious groups formally disowning past records of
egregious human injustice is mushrooming.3 Although the Age of Apology4 is a global phenomenon, the
question of reparations—a tort-based mode of redress whereby a wrongdoing group accepts legal
responsibility and compensates victims for the damage it inflicted upon them5—likely consumes more
energy, emotion, and resources in the U.S. than in any other jurisdiction. Since the final year of the Cold
War, the U.S. and its political subdivisions have apologized or paid compensation to Japanese-American
internees,6 native Hawaiians,7 civilians killed in the Korean War,8 and African American victims of
medical experiments,9 racial violence,10 and lending discrimination;11 a barrage of lawsuits demanding
reparations from slavery profiteers is on the dockets of several courts, and more are expected.12 In the
U.S. circa 2004, reparations is the stuff not only of litigation but legislative proposals, academic and
popular articles, news editorials, town hall meetings, campus demonstrations, television programs, office
water cooler debates, dinner table conversations, and cyberchat groups. If reparations is not a uniquely
American remedy, it is no stretch to say that in the U.S. “reparations talk”13 is very much with us.
The phrase “reparations talk” is an understatement. “Reparations debate” better describes current
social discourse over what to do about gross historical injustices. Although advocates maintain that
reparations is the first step in recovering history and fashioning a more equitable collective future, critics
describe a divisive and retrospective14 movement threatening to widen racial and ethnic fault lines running
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through the American body politic. Consequently, reparative justice is hotly contested on doctrinal,
political, and practical grounds: opponents reject the notion of collective harm and responsibility15 for
“ancient wrongs,”16 deny linkages between the relative socioeconomic status of aggrieved racial minority
17

groups and past injustices, and cling to limiting doctrines that deny remedies for acts and omissions that
were lawful centuries ago.18 Reparations thus fuels unresolvable debates over the nature of minority
disenfranchisement, the adequacy of civil rights legislation,19 the constitutionality of group entitlements,
the ideal racial distribution of socioeconomic power, and the appropriate channel to pilot between the
pursuit of racial justice and the preservation of social peace.20 Moreover, because a successful reparations
movement might awaken other dormant claims, reparations debates generate resistance21 and backlash.22
Still, even if it can be realized only at the price of social unrest and the painful reopening of old
wounds, reparations may well be the appropriate remedy in the case of specific meta-wrongs, foremost
among them slavery.23 A significant element in the slavery reparations claim is the lost value
consequence of the unpaid labor extracted from slave ancestors,24 and thus it is logical that, with few
exceptions,25 proponents of slavery reparations equate the remedy with financial compensation.26
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Although money cannot undo history, it can ameliorate the socioeonomic conditions of the descendants of
former slaves, and money is the lodestar of most reparationists.27
However, justice is not a one-size-fits-all commodity, and the potential suitability of
compensatory remedies to the harms absorbed by any particular group is not dispositive of, nor even
instructive in regard to, the question of whether reparations is appropriate for other claimant groups.
Slavery is not the sole, nor the first, nor even, arguably, the most egregious historical injustice for which
the U.S. bears responsibility.28 Moreover, cash is not the primary, or even an important, objective of some
aggrieved groups. Non-monetary modes of redress29 may be more effective in inducing the national
government to accept moral responsibility, in restoring the dignity and autonomy of injured groups, and
in healing, reconstituting, and relegitimizing the nation.30
In other words, the specific claims posed by each aggrieved group bear examination and
evaluation on their unique merits. Although the interests of groups may converge on particular issues and
proposals emerging in reparations debates,31 what suffices to make one group “whole” may be wholly
inadequate for, or even harmful to, another. Prevailing theories of justice, even those drafted in goodfaith with the intent that they be universally applicable or at least readily malleable in transit from one
application to another, may in fact be so bounded by the cultures and worldviews in which they were
incubated that they are unable to recognize, capture, and remedy all the injuries inflicted upon the
aggrieved group. Without judging its value as a remedy in general, reparations, as well as other theories
of justice sketched and pitched at a high level of abstraction but without a comprehensive analysis of the
context and history of the claims of the particular group in question, may, when applied, be useless at best
and damaging at worst. Just as “all politics is local,”32 so is all (in)justice.
For the indigenous peoples33 who have inhabited, since time immemorial, the lands within the
external borders of the U.S., remediation of historical injustice is a pressing issue. Despite this,
reparations would fail to advance, and might even frustrate, important Indian objectives, primarily the
reacquisition of the capacity to self-determine as autonomous political communities on ancestral lands.
Because the immense injustice at the core of U.S. national history is neither broadly acknowledged nor
27
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deeply understood, Part I of this Article will provide some historical foundation and briefly sketch the
necessary factual predicate to the Indian34 claim for redress. Part II will present and evaluate several
theories of justice with respect to this claim. Part III will counter these theories with an indigenist theory
of justice intended to transcend the limitations of extant theories and accord the full measure of relief to
Indian claimants consistent with the requirements of justice for all individuals and groups.
I.

The Indian Claim for Redress
35

“I want to tell you this, because I believe if you know it you will correct the evil.”

The brutal reality of invasion, slavery, forced relocation, genocide, land theft, ethnocide, and
forcible denial of the right to self-determine has not percolated deeply into contemporary understandings
of U.S-Indian history. The role of the U.S. in the deliberate destruction of Indian populations, property
rights, and cultural patrimonies is for most Americans a hidden history that must be revealed and asserted
as a factual predicate supporting redress before theories of justice can be evaluated.36
37

A. Genocide: “The Metaphysics of Indian Hating”
1. Conquest

In May 1493, Pope Alexander VI called upon Spanish conquistadores to discover and conquer
38
new lands in the Americas in order to draw “barbarous nations” to the Christian faith. The subsequent

invasion of the Western Hemisphere, predicated upon a jurisprudential assumption that the indigenous
inhabitants were a distinctly inferior species,39 was governed by the legal principles of discovery40 and
conquest. As a matter of existing international law, a nation became sovereign of territory its agents
“discovered” provided it subjugated the population and annexed its lands.41 Although prudence restrained
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pre-18 century aggression in what became the U.S, conquest was eventually applied in all the
Americas, and the period subsequent to first contact is notorious as the “Age of Genocide.” 43
2. Slavery
In the aftermath of conquests, colonizers offered financial incentives to corporate slavers
to create bounties between tribes, facilitating a divide and conquer strategy that served territorial
objectives while providing free Indian slave labor to developing economies.44 Although Indian
slavery had largely discontinued in favor of African American slavery by the early 19th century,
Californian Indians, as late as the early 20th century, were regularly raided by slave-hunters
looking for men to work in mines and women to work in brothels, and extermination befell many
who resisted.45
3. Ethnic Cleansing46
The precise number of Indian victims of the genocide47 committed by Euro-American colonizers over
the past half-millennium evades quantification. Estimates of the pre-Columbian indigenous population in
what later became the U.S. range from 5-94 million,48 yet by 1880 disease,49 slaughter, slavery, and
aggressive wars had reduced their number to as few as 300,000—and declining.50 Although luminaries
such as President Thomas Jefferson denounced the genocide as it unfolded,51 the prevailing racial
ideology reassured the public that the disappearance of an inferior people before the U.S. continental
advance was a “historical and scientific inevitability.52 Initially, a legislative approach effected physical
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removal of Indian people from ancestral lands; however, when this proved inefficient, measures more
clearly within the inherent powers of the executive and therefore less susceptible to judicial review were
devised:54 Indian genocide became official policy of the U.S. and its political subdivisions.55
In the aftermath of the Civil War the might of the U.S. Army was directed toward Indian
eradication. Contractors induced deliberate starvation by destroying the buffalo,56 yet Indian tenacity
necessitated more direct applications of force.57 One by one, tribes were hunted, pursued, cornered, and
murdered.58 A series of “massacres” were written in Indian blood on the pages of American history: Blue
River (1854), Bear River (1863), Sand Creek (1864),59 Washita River (1868), Sappa Creek (1875), Camp
Robinson (1878), Wounded Knee (1890), and over forty others.60 Gruesome, exterminations of
defenseless women and children were perfectly legal exercises of State and federal authority as the law
then stood.61 By the conclusion of the “Indian Wars” in 1886,62 the pre-Columbian Indian population had
been reduced as much 98%,63 and an Indian-free U.S. was not beyond possibility.64 Although radical
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with vermin and disease and lacking in adequate shelter and food. Desperate reservation populations were initially forbidden to
depart by illegal threats of renewed military force. See United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 700-01
(C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14, 891) (holding, contrary to position of War Department, that Indians are “persons within the meaning
of the law” with rights to protest and move freely throughout U.S.).
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depopulation of Indian land may have been merely an efficient means to annex territory, the U.S.
nontheless committed genocide in overtly manifesting a clear intent to kill, and killing, Indians as such.65
66

B. Land Theft

The relationship between the land and Indian people is fundamental to their physical and cultural
survival as distinct, autonomous groups. Indian land is constitutive of the Indian cultural identity67 and
68
designative of the boundaries of the Indian cultural universe. Long before first contact with European

“discoverers,” Indians proclaimed a sacred responsibility to preserve and transmit Indian land, and with it
identity, religion, and culture, to successive generations.69 The discharge of that responsibility has been
compromised by U.S. policies of land acquisition ranging from fraud to outright theft.
Throughout the 17th and early 18th centuries, prudence directed Euro-Americans to formally
recognize militarily potent Indian tribes as independent sovereigns and accord them diplomatic
recognition.70 The Euro-American foothold in North America remained tenuous, and ongoing military
insecurity stymied territorial ambitions while stifling any notions of conquest. Moreover, U.S. land
hunger was largely sated by available space within the original thirteen colonies, and most land
acquisitions from Indian tribes were of necessity accomplished by treaties of cession71 after peaceful
negotiations.72 Still, if during its first several decades of existence the fledgling U.S. was obliged to
recognize the sovereignty of Indian nations and to respect Indian land titles as a matter of international

65

See Genocide Convention,supra note 47, at art. II. Forced sterilization of Indian women in BIA health clinics also constituted
genocide within the meaning of the Convention. See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, POPULATION CONTROL POLITICS:
WOMEN, STERILIZATION, AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 91 (1985) (noting routine sterilization of up to 3000 Indian
women per year by the Indian Health Service); Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 The
United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native
Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002) (describing covert sterilization of up to 42% of Indian women of childbearing age
between 1930 and 1976) (citing Bill Wagner, Lo, The Poor and Sterilized Indian, America 75, January 29, 1977).
66
See ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 13-14 (1990) (“The property-owners of the [U.S.] are not the legitimate heirs
of Lockean individuals who performed. . . . acts of original acquisition; they are the inheritors of those who . . . used violence to
steal . . . vast tracts [.]”).
67
See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 122 (2d ed. 1994) (“Indian tribes . . . identify
their origin as a distinct people with a particular geographic site. This origin place—which may be a river, mountain, plateau, or
valley—becomes a central and defining feature of the tribe’s religion and cultural world view[.]”).
68
Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1615,
1640 (2000).
69
See THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 22-23 (Menno Boldt & Anthony
Long eds., 1985) [hereinafter BOLDT & LONG] (“Our aboriginal responsibility is to preserve the land for our children[.]”). So
sacred is the Indian obligation to preserve the tribal landbase for future generations that the loss of Indian land, and the severance
of links to ancestors, religion, and culture, is universally deemed the ultimate catastrophe. See DALE VAN EVERY,
DISINHERITED: THE LOST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 239 (1966).
70
See William N. Fenton, Leadership in the Northeastern Woodlands of North America, 10 AM. IND. Q. 21, 81 (1986).
71
For Indian tribes, entry into treaty relations with the U.S. was a sacred act undertaken to secure mutual advantages as well as
create kinship bonds of peace and friendship. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN
INDIAN VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 71, 112 (1997) (describing U.S.-Indian treaties as “multicultural
agreements that impart duties of good faith and fair dealing”). For the U.S., Indian treaties were constitutive documents
providing the framework for an economic and political joinder of mutual sovereigns. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 409 (1993).
Thus, the Indian treaties of the post-Revolutionary period, though they ceded Indian land in exchange for U.S. promises, must be
construed not as acts of tribal surrender but as negotiated contracts, governed by international law, in which Indian tribes
reserved those rights not clearly granted to the U.S. and acquired other rights and privileges from the U.S. Id. at 402.
72
th
The late 18 century U.S. policy with regard to land acquisition from Indian tribes is seemingly predicated upon a desire for
peaceful relations and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. See Letter from Secretary of State Knox (1789)
(“The principle of the Indian right to the lands they possess being thus conceded, the dignity and the interest of the nation will be
advanced by making it the basis of the future administration of justice toward the Indian tribes.”); see also 25 U.S.C. §177 (1793)
(“Trade and Intercourse Act”) (precluding acquisition of Indian land except for by cession via a U.S.-Indian treaty). In those rare
th
18 century instances of military hostilities initiated by the U.S. to annex Indian land, most campaigns resulted in stalemate or
decisive Indian victory. CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 42, at 193.
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73

and domestic law, from the moment of its creation the U.S. was crafting legal solutions to the “problems
caused by the . . . fact that the Indians were here when the white man arrived[.]”74
1. Fraud and Firewater
The Indian conception of land as utterly incapable of reduction to ownership by human beings75—
an essential element of pan-Indian cosmology76—crippled tribes in their early negotiations with U.S.
77
representatives operating within an imported common law tradition that commodified land. While

Indian tribes generally understood treaties to create sacred kinship ties entitling the U.S. to share and
settle the lands in question,78 the U.S., disinterested in kinship but desirous of no less than fee simple title,
manipulated Indian (mis)appreciations of Western property rights in treaty texts incomprehensible to
Indian negotiators not proficient in the English language.79 Moreover, U.S. negotiators secured further
advantage by dulling Indian wits with alcohol.80 Deliberately faulty translations of treaty terms for Indian
tribes as well as a Weltanschauung in which land is a sacred living thing incapable of reduction to
ownership exacerbated an unequal bargaining relationship and erased the line between consent and
coercion.81 Worse, later treaties simply codified conquest and genocide. In sum, many of the Indian

73

See Statement of U.S. Attorney General William Wert, Apr. 26, 1821 (“So long as a tribe exists and remains in possession of its
lands, its title and possession are sovereign and exclusive . . . [and] we have no more right to enter upon their territory than we
have to enter upon the territory of a foreign prince.”) (cited in Atkinson, supra note 45, at 383).
74
FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 1 (1994). The
Indian presence posed not only a military, but a legal, challenge to white settlement. Although the discovery doctrine purported
to grant the U.S., as successor state of Great Britain, the right to impair title to all Indian lands “discovered” by Great Britain, the
Indian nations “discovered” by Britain retained aboriginal title, subject only to the superior sovereign title of the U.S., and as of
th
the early 19 century many private titles claimed by whites under original grants by either the U.S. or Great Britain remained
clouded by prior possessory rights as yet unceded by Indian tribes. See Mitchell v. United States (1835) (Baldwin, J.) (“[It is] a
settled principle, that [the Indians’] right of occupancy is . . . as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.”).
75
See Eric T. Freyfoggle, Land Use and the Study of Early American History, 94 YALE L. J. 717, 723 (1985) (“ [Indian tribes]
believed that land was no more subject to ownership than was air, water, sky, or . . . spirits”).
76
See VAN EVERY, supra note 69, at 239.
77
See CHARLES M. HAAR & L. LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 15 (1977) (quoting letter from Chief Joseph of
the Nez Perce tribe to President Franklin Pierce) (“[T]he white man . . . is a stranger who comes in the night and takes from the
land whatever he needs. The earth is not his brother but his enemy, and when he has conquered it he moves on.”); Carol M.
Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1985) (“the audience presupposed by [common law
property concepts] is an agrarian or a commercial people” rather than the more nomadic or pastoral Indian peoples).
78
See Gerald Torres, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Translating Yonnodio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian
Case, 1990 DUKE L. J. 625, 637 -38 (1990) (noting inability of Indian tribes to understand Western property concepts).
79
See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992) (suggesting language
barriers and variant conceptions of relationship of people to land caused misunderstanding of legal nature of grants to whites).
80
STEPHEN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 26 (1991).
81
th
20 -century federal jurisprudence, in recognition of the fundamental unfairness prevailing during the creation of many Indian
treaties, belatedly adopted canons of construction to guide interpretation of these instruments and mitigate the severity of their
operation against Indian rights. As the U.S. is the party with presumptively superior negotiating skills and knowledge of the
language of an Indian treaty, the Court has held that it has the responsibility to avoid taking advantage of Indians and therefore
has interpreted the terms of treaties liberally in favor of Indian parties. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 200
(1999); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979). The canons
of construction also require courts to give effect to the terms of an Indian treaty as the Indians themselves would have understood
them at the time of their drafting. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 246 (1985) (providing that “treaties
should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-381 (1905). Ambiguities in Indian treaties are to be resolved “not according to the technical meaning
of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians[.]” Washington, 443
U.S. at 675-76; Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564, 576-577 (1908). Still, courts are “without authority to determine the rights of the
parties upon the ground of mere justice and fairness, much less, under the guise of interpretation, to depart from the plain import
of the words of the treaty.” United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 535 (1900); see also South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) (“The canons of construction. . . [do] not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist;
nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress.”). Thus, despite the ameliorative influence of the canons
of construction, Indian treaties themselves can impede enjoyment of Indian rights.
8

82

83

84

treaties ceding land to the U.S. are physical embodiments of the fraud, unconscionability, and duress
governing their drafting and as such are arguably subject to reconstruction and even renunciation.85
2. Conquest by Fiction: Johnson v. M’Intosh

By the early 19th century the U.S. population was clamoring for more Indian land even as tribes,
increasingly aware of the insatiability of white land hunger, began to resist. Original legal protections for
Indian land grew incompatible with white notions of progress, and pressure mounted to annul the
marriage of political convenience and legal principle effected by the discovery doctrine.86 However, even
as the U.S. waxed ever more potent, Indian tribes retained the capacity to defeat conquest, and law was
invoked yet again to wrest away additional Indian lands. The seminal case Johnson v. M’Intosh87
provided the opportunity whereby to expand the Euro-American foothold.
Although he acknowledged both the “impossibility of undoing past events and the fact that the
sovereign he represented was born in sin,”88 and although he recognized that Indian tribes were as yet
independent political communities in retention of original rights to property and self-governance, Chief
Justice John Marshall accepted the extravagant arguments that European discovery—not Indian
occupancy—constituted ultimate title to lands in the U.S.89 and that conquest by the discovering sovereign
conferred good title.90 While Marshall conceded that such arguments “may be opposed to natural right,”
he drew from the doctrine of stare decisis,91 comparisons to the practice of other states,92 and ultimately a
jurisprudential affirmation of the “inferiority” of Indian nations93 to find that “if [such arguments] be
indispensable to that system under which the [U.S.] has been settled, and be adapted to the actual
82

See Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96 (Ct. App. N.Y., 1912) (elaborating implied duty of good faith in contracting); see
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (January 27, 1990) [“Vienna
Convention”], at Art. 49 (providing as a matter of customary international law that “if a [party] has been induced to conclude a
treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another [party], the [party] may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound[.]”).
83
See, e,g., Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.Cir. 1965) (holding that unconscionability
includes absence of meaningful choice coupled with contractual terms unreasonably favoring the other party); see also Vienna
Convention, supra note 82, at Art. 53 (providing, as an international legal definition of unconscionability, that “a treaty is void if,
at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a preemptory norm of general international law.”)
84
See, e.g., Employers Ins. Of Wausau v. United States, 764 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (providing that duress consists of
the involuntary acceptance of terms of another party where circumstances permit of no other alternative and such circumstances
were the result of coercive acts of the other party); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 82, at Arts. 51-52 (“[a] treaty is void
if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force”).
85
See Friedman, supra note 41, at 559 (arguing that Indian cessions of lands in fraudulent, unconscionable, or duressive treaties
are void or voidable); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1820 (1981) (developing basis for judicial reconstruction or voiding of unconscionable contracts).
86
P.T. SHATTUCK & J. NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM 113 (1991).
87
21 U.S. at 543.
88
Joseph William Singer, Well-Settled? The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV.
481, 489-90 (1994).
89
See 21 U.S. at 574 (“[T]he rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily . . .
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it[;]
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the
soil at their own will . . . was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made
it. While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be
in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
possession of the natives . . . subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”)
90
Id. at 588-89 (noting that while the denial of good title to original Indian occupants was unjust, “Conquest gives a title which
the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”)
91
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (deeming Indian land vacant for purpose of uncompensated taking by State).
92
M’Intosh at 592 (noting uniform practice of European states in accepting discovery and conquest as operative in the Americas).
93
Id. at 573 (“the character and religion of [Indians] afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the
superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy.”).
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94

condition of the two people, it . . . certainly cannot be rejected by Courts[.]” Although the progressive
Marshall intended to impose legal limits on the future conduct of conquerors less charitably disposed
toward Indians than he,95 M’Intosh fueled subsequent claims that “Indians were conquered as soon as
John Cabot set foot on American soil,” “that it only required the inevitable march of history to carry out
this preordained outcome,” and that “tribal property rights are not . . . rights at all, but merely . . .
revocable licenses, or . . . ‘permission by the whites to occupy.’”96
3. Trust Doctrine: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
Subsequent cases further diminished tribal sovereignty over Indian land. In the 1831 case,
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,97 the second in the Marshall Trilogy, Chief Justice Marshall determined that,
despite their retention of reserved rights, to include occupancy of their lands subject only to voluntary
cession,98 Indian tribes were mere “domestic dependent nations” under U.S. “pupilage,”99 not sovereign
foreign nations or States within the meaning of the Constitution,100 and that as a result the Court could not
take original jurisdiction over a case wherein the Cherokee sought to enjoin enforcement of the laws of
Georgia on land guaranteed by treaties.101 Although Marshall held that the U.S. owed a common-law trust
duty to Indians, not only was this duty judicially unenforceable,102 but an examination of the other
justices’ opinions, construing the U.S.-Cherokee relationship as that between a conqueror and a subject
people,103 hinted that the “trust doctrine,” true to its roots in medieval Christian xenophobism,104 would
become yet another legal tool with which to diminish Indian sovereignty.105 In short order, the U.S.
94

Id. at 591-92.
See id. at 597-98 (“The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered, in some respects, as a dependent, and in some
respects as a distinct people, . . . too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required, that means should be
adopted for the preservation of peace; and that their friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property. This
was to be effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites . . . The authority for this . . . ha(s) always been sustained in
our Courts.”); see also id. at 574 (making clear that in the absence of conquest, Indian title can only be lawfully acquired by the
U.S. through a consensual transfer, as Indians were the “rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain
possession of it . . . [The Indian] right of possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the
complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right.”).
96
Singer, supra note 134, at 489-90 (noting citation of conquest theories derived from M’Intosh for proposition that Congress has
unlimited authority over Indians) (citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955) (Reed, J.).
97
Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 1.
98
See id. at 17 (“ Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable . . . right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be
extinguished by a voluntary cession”).
99
(“[Indian tribes] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the [U.S.] resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to
our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the
president as their great father.”). Id.
100
Id. at 11-12 (citing U.S. CONST. Art. III, sec. 2).
101
Id. at 10.
102
Id. at 20 (“If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it
be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the
past or prevent the future.”).
103
See Cherokee, 30 U. S. at 16 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 32- 33 (Baldwin, J., concurring). The dissent proved more
consonant with the trend in international law, which, although it continued to sanction the creation of consensual guardianships
with powers and duties limited by treaties between sovereign peoples, shortly thereafter abandoned altogether any consideration
of indigenous peoples as political bodies with rights. See ANAYA,supra note 38, at 14.
104
See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1996) (arguing that the trust doctrine is
a “form of scientific racism” that posits that whites have a duty to “wean native peoples from their ‘backward’ ways and to
‘civilize’ them”); see also Freidman, supra note 85, at 563-64 (“From the very beginning, the federal-tribal trust doctrine . . .
explicitly relied upon the ‘primitivism’ of natives to justify interference in their affairs. “); CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra
note 42, at 196 (noting that the trust doctrine was the political will of a white population committed to the notion that Indians
were a semi-barbarous people who ought to yield to white civilization).
105
Such fears proved well-founded when the Supreme Court explained the trust obligation as the duty to act as “a Christian
people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race.” Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877). The “white man’s
th
burden” motivated federal Indian policy as actualized through the trust doctrine well into the 20 century. See U.S. v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28, 39, 46 (1913) (“Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely
10
95

106

claimed trust title to all Indian lands within U.S. borders. Although the trust doctrine generated a host
of express obligations in the context of subsequent treaties, statutes, and executive orders creating Indian
reservations,107 political pressure ensured that these judicially unenforceable obligations were almost
108

never discharged with “good faith and utter loyalty to the best interests” of the Indian tribes.
4. Plenary Power: Worcester v. Georgia

In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall interpreted the Commerce Clause109 to hold that Congress had
“plenary” power over Indian affairs.110 Although the precise meaning of the term “plenary” was not
subject to ready determination,111 its purpose was plain, and by 1900 Congress qualified all remaining
tribal powers by express legislation.112 Moreover, by the late 1840s, with the military power calculus
shifting113 and gold discovered out West, “whites c[ould] no longer be kept out of Indian country.”114 By

influenced by superstition and fetishism, and chiefly governed according to crude customs inherited from their ancestors,
[Indians] are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people . . . As a superior and civilized nation [the U.S. has] the power
and the duty of exercising a foster care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders[.]”
106
Over the course of the past two centuries the trust doctrine has broadened to encompass a set of duties greater those pertaining
strictly to land, including to “ensure the survival and welfare of Indian tribes and people” and to “provide those services required
to protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and self-government, and also includes those economic and social programs
which are necessary to raise the standard of living and social well-being of the Indian people to a level comparable to the nonIndian society.” ROBERT N. WELLS, JR., NATIVE AMERICAN RESURGENCE AND RENEWAL 19 (1994).
107
U.S.-Indian treaties post- Cherokee unambiguously contemplated discrete reserved land bases where Indian tribes would
exercise beneficial ownership while enjoying political, economic, and cultural sovereignty under U.S. guardianship. See
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14, 16 (1987) (asserting that the central thrust of federal Indian law has always been to
create a “measured separatism”). Indian tribes under the trust doctrine would remain distinct peoples in a political relationship
with the U.S. based on the treaties and the Commerce Clause, which sets Indian tribes apart from States and foreign nations as
sovereigns and provides that Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate trade. See U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.).
108
In a democratic republic, a self-interested majority represents a powerful barrier to honoring treaty-commitments benefitting a
discrete minority not formally an organic part of the body politic yet in possession of vast lands and resources. See JOHN ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980) (“There will always be a conflict when a government . . . must act both as
trustee in the best interests of a small segment of the populace and also as a servant of the best interests of the entire society.”);
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) (addressing majoritarian problem).
109
See U.S. CONST., art I., sec. 8. cl. 3 (granting power to Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
110
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 536-63 (1832). However, even as it expanded Congressional power, Worcester restricted State
jurisdiction. Id. at 561 (“[The] Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force”).
111
The “plenary power” doctrine, with origins in medieval-era traditions of Christian cultural racism, was carried into the New
World by Columbus, developed by successive European arrivals, and reified as moral imperative in U.S. jurisprudence to permit
the “superior” race to exercise whatever power necessary to “civilize” indigenous peoples. DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 177 (3d ed. 1993); see also Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal
Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 319, 360
(arguing plenary power “erase[s] the difference presented by the Indian in order to sustain . . . European norms and value
structures”). Other commentators suggest Marshall’s use of the term “plenary” was not meant to denote “absolute” or “total”
power but rather to signify federal, as opposed to State powers, thereby shielding tribal sovereignty from State legislation. See
Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. 507, 524 (1987). The orthodox view suggests that “plenary” as used in Worcester implies general police powers, as
opposed to the limited, delegated powers the federal government bears in relation to States, and as such arrogates to Congress
th
general powers to regulate every aspect of Indian affairs. WILKINSON, supra note 107, at 78-79. By the late 19 century
“plenary power” was accepted as the absolute prerogative of Congress vis-à-vis the Indian tribes. See United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 381-84 (1886) (holding Congress has“incontrovertible right” to exercise authority over Indians for their “own wellbeing”); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (holding Congress, under its plenary power, could abrogate a treaty
when doing so “would be in the interests of the country and the Indians themselves”). Plenary power to dispose of Indian land is
a nonjusticiable political question, and no Congressional exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian affairs has ever been set
aside by the courts. See CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 42, at 200 (noting plenary power renders all disputes arising
all U.S. Indian legislation non-justiciable political questions).
112
See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3 (Lyman H. Legters &
Fremont J. Lyden eds., 1994) [hereinafter LEGTERS & LYDEN] (noting that subsequent to Kagama, Congress passed the first
of more than 5000 laws regulating Indians).
113
After the Civil War, U.S. military power was so overwhelming that all subtlety was abandonded, and armed force was
employed against Indian nations west of the Mississippi. See ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY 115 (1935).
11

adding plenary power to the legal arsenal, Worcester and its progeny ushered in a violent phase of U.S.
expansion, executed under the rubric “Manifest Destiny.”115
Over the next several decades the Army prosecuted a sequence of wars to perfect discovery by
116

divesting Indians of their possessory interest.
117

after U.S. violations of Indian treaties.

Still other wars were fought to suppress Indian unrest

After each genocidal campaign, a dwindled, harried, and hungry

Indian nation in extremis sued for a peace that surrendered vast tracts of lands and political freedom in
exchange for dependence118 and “civilization.”119 During the first decade after the Civil War the U.S.
acquired nearly 1/4 of the land within its modern contiguous boundaries120 entirely free of any legal
obligation to pay more than token compensation.121 Yet despite distribution of millions of cheap acres to
settlers122 the national greed for space, fueled by an evolving inter-branch compact authorizing gratis

114

VAN EVERY, supra note 69, at 260. By the late 1840s, homesteaders and prospectors pressured policymakers to grant access
to the material wealth of the American West—an area populated theretofore almost exclusively by Indian nations. See BRIAN
W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES AND UNITED STATES’ INDIAN POLICY 73 (1982).
115
th
“Manifest Destiny,” a term which first appeared in print in 1845, refers to the 19 century political philosophy holding that the
U.S. was charged with a divinely-inspired mission of extending its moral enlightenment, democratic principles, and republican
values to the furthest reaches of North America. See generally WEINBERG, supra note 113. If fulfilment of this Manifest
Destiny required the defeat, displacement, and murder of Indians, the imprimatur of the Supreme Court supported the
th
inevitability of the expansion of the frontier and affirmed divine approbation of the mid- to late-19 century Indian Wars. Id.
116
Theretofore, Indian claims based on lineal descendancy and exclusive occupancy earned recognition, by treaty or statute, of a
limited possessory right to permanent occupancy known as “recognized Indian title.” See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543.
117
The Supremacy Clause establishes treaties as legal authority coequal to the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2
(“This Constitution, and the Laws . . . which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made . . . under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land[.]”). A violation of a treaty is therefore a violation of federal law unless
Congress subsequently and unambiguously legislates to abrogate the treaty. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)
(citing common-law rule supporting legislative modification of treaties); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)
(providing Congress may modify treaty provisions, or “supersede them altogether[,]” by subsequent statute). Although an Indian
treaty thus binds all branches of government, Congress has plenary power to abrogate or otherwise limit it provided it does so
explicitly and “with perfect good faith toward Indians,” which good faith is legally presumed. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553; see
also Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (upholding, under political question doctrine,
plenary power to abrogate Indian treaties). Moral restraint has been in as short supply as “perfect good faith:” to cure breaches of
land provisions of Indian treaties occasioned by invasion Congress passed abrogating statutes allowing the U.S. to violate with
impunity all of the more than 400 Indian treaties. Singer, supra note 88, at 483-84. For a historical review of Congressional bad
faith, see VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES (1985).
118
Id. at 382 (“The [U.S.] Army dogged tribes across the plains, through the forests[,] in and out of desert canyons, and through
the swamps . . . until tribe after tribe realized they would have to sign a terrible treaty or face extinction[.]”). Treaty promises of
annuities for peace were bitter bargains: defeated tribes were confined on distant, strange lands, restricted from engaging in
traditional subsistence practices, and forced into dependency. Id.
119
See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) (“Congress . . . expected . . . the semi-barbarous condition of the Indian
tribes [to] give way to the highest civilization of our race.”)
120
See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, and Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L.
REV. 453, 461 (1994) (discussing expropriation of one billion acres of Indian land from 1865-1875).
121
The Court refuses to confine plenary power within the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses, choosing abstention under
the political question doctrine. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553. Although it held that takings of Indian property are subject to the
th
5 Amendment, the Court adopted a formal distinction that permitted Congress near-unlimited freedom in establishing
compensation requirements. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (Reed., J.) (“[T]he tribes who
inhabited the [U.S.] held claim to such lands after the coming of the white man, under what is . . . termed original Indian title or
permission from the whites to occupy. That . . . means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress . . .
This is not a property right but . . . a right of occupancy that may be terminated . . . by the sovereign . . . without any legally
enforceable obligation to [pay] compensat[ion].”) Given the judicially-crafted distinction between “recognized Indian title” and
“aboriginal title,” Congress may take even those lands exclusively occupied by a tribe since time immemorial and extinguish
Indian occupancy at will, without compensation, and for any purpose, so long as those lands were not conveyed by an official act
of Congress or so long as the tribe did not claim them by treaty. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 118
S.Ct. 948, 955-56 (1998) (requiring explicit congressional designation to find recognized title); CADWALADER & DELORIA,
supra note 42, at 187-88 (Indians occupying aboriginal title land are “mere tenants at the will of the [U.S.]”). Even with respect to
recognized title, Congress may pay compensation at levels bearing no discernible nexus to market value. See Babbitt v. Youpee,
117 S.Ct. 727 (1997) (subjecting plenary power only to limited constitutional restraint that Congress pay some compensation
when extinguishing recognized title). In sum, Indian property is beyond the Constitutional pale. See Newton, supra note 120, at
457-58 (analogizing federal Indian law to Communist law in that neither afford meaningful protection against takings).
122
See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862 (granting 250 million acres of Indian land to settlers at as little as $1/acre).
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takings, dictated confiscation of most of the remainder of Indian Country. In 1871 Congress exercised
plenary power to strip away the last formal vestiges of Indian juridical sovereignty by providing that
“hereafter no Indian nation or tribe . . . shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”124 No longer compelled as a matter
of U.S. law to treat Indian nations as foreign sovereigns, the U.S. could now acquire Indian land without
even the pretense of consent, and Congress, unwilling to allow “(a)n idle and thriftless race of savages . . .
to stand guard at the treasure vaults of the nation[,]” gave the Army free rein to employ genocide125 to
crush the last obstacles on the march to the Pacific.
5. Allotment to Present
By 1887 all two billion acres of the U.S. continental landmass had been discovered, conquered,
and expropriated save for 138 million acres apportioned to Indian reservations, which the General
Allotment Act of 1887 [“Allotment”]126 targeted for dismemberment. Allotment, an exercise of plenary
power, subdivided large swaths of communally-owned tribal lands into parcels for the private use of
individual Indian allottees under a 25-year period of U.S. guardianship.127 Upon expiration of the trust
period the U.S. issued an unrestricted fee patent to allottees who proved “competence,” assumed U.S.
citizenship, and paid property taxes.128 For most tribes, Allotment was devastating: although tribal
governments remained in situs on vestiges still under trust protection, by encouraging Indian individuals
to formally withdraw from the tribe129 for a per capita share of tribal land, and by punishing the failure of
unemployed allottees to pay taxes with foreclosure, reversion of title, and sale to white speculators,130
Allotment abolished Indian reservations as autonomous and integral sociopolitical entities.131
132

Although several tribes attempted to block Allotment, the Supreme Court ruled not only that
Indian land was subject to the sovereign right to take for public use upon payment of just compensation,133
but that takings of Indian land, described by Congress as a legitimate form of “investing for the tribe” that
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See Singer, supra note 88, at 483-84 (stating that, as all questions relating to Indian affairs were now nonjusticiable political
questions, “Congress and the President therefore possessed absolute, unreviewable power over Indian nations.”).
124
Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (as amended at 25 U.S.C. §71 (1994)).
125
Scores of tribes, their numbers reduced by war, disease, and starvation, were forced onto land reservations in the 1870s and
1880s. The surviving three hundred members of the last belligerents, the Chiricahua Apache, surrendered unconditionally in
1887 after the murder of three thousand of their number. For a comprehensive history of the genocide of the Chiricahua Apache,
see generally LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 62.
126
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
127
Id. The original plan was to allot tribal heads of household 160 acres each and to make surplus land available to non-Indians.
See WILKINSON, supra note 107, at 19-20 (1987). However, effects varied, and while some reservations, such as the Jicarilla
Apache, remained unallotted (see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 (1982)), others, such as the Lake
Traverse Reservation of the Wahpeton and Sisseton Bands of the Sioux Tribe, were held to be terminated once 85% of the
reservation had been purchased by non-Indians. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427-28 (1975).
128
See PEVAR, supra note 80, at 62 (noting that Allotment subjected individual Indian landowners to the full panoply of
Territorial and State laws, including property taxation).
129
The concept that an Indian could not simultaneously be a tribal member and a U.S. citizen persisted until Congress granted
citizenship to “all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States.” See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43
Stat. 253 (codified as carried forward at 8 U.S.C. 1401(b) (1988)). Prior to 1924, “Indian naturalization was conditioned on the
severing of tribal ties[.]” FELIX COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 644 (1953).
130
JAMES LOPAC & RICHMOND CLOW, TRIBAL GOVERNMENT TODAY 20 (1990).
131
See PEVAR, supra note 80, at 5 (describing Allotment as a partitioning of the tribal estate).
132
Kiowa Chief Lone Wolf sued unsuccessfully to prevent allotment of 2.5 million acres of tribal lands, guaranteed by treaty
against allotment, without the signature of 2/3 of adult males. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (providing that compensation for
takings of Indian land need not be paid where Congress acts as a trustee in the “best interest” of Indian tribes despite violation of
treaty) (abrogating Medicine Lodge Treaty, 15 Stat. 581, 589 (1867).
133
See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (upholding allotment of Indian land despite violation of treaties).
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did not require either consent or notification, were precluded from judicial review.

By 1934, Indian

lands had been reduced by a further 90 million acres, with 26 million lost through fraudulent transfers,
and of the two billion acres of formerly contiguous tribal landholdings all that remained was a
fragmented, 47 million acre mosaic of reservation lands under trust, plots owned in fee simple by whites,
and plots held by Indian individuals no longer members of any tribe.135 95,000 Indians were landless.136
In sum, the synergy of discovery, the trust doctrine, and plenary power as manifested in caselaw
and federal policies perfected the legal theft of Indian land.137 Despite infrequent restitution and
compensation of Indian land,138 the Constitution affords no protection to Indian tribes,139 and what remains
of their landbase continues under siege.140 The U.S. currently wields
absolute, unreviewable power to continue the conquest of Indian nations that have not yet been
forced to sign a treaty . . . [and to] take land held under original title as it pleases, . . . without any
constitutionally mandated obligation to pay compensation for the taking of land possessed by
Indian nations for thousands of years, and despite the fact that the members of such tribes are
141
United States citizens otherwise protected by the Constitution.
142

C. Ethnocide
134

Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (establishing that Congressional exercise of plenary power in regulation of Indian affairs, even to
the extent of abrogating treaty-based property rights, is immune from judicial review under political question doctrine). A skein
of subsequent cases has reinforced, as a matter of domestic law, the sweeping breadth and depth of plenary power to abridge
Indian treaty-based property rights. See William J. Murphy, Jurisdiction—Sovereign Immunity—Business Owned by Native
American Nation Granted Sovereign Immunity from Suit Arising From Its Private Off-Reservation Transaction, In re Greene, 980
th
F.2d 590 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 681 (1994), SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. J. 599, 601 n.16 (1994) (listing cases).
Still, several Indian tribes continue, perhaps quixotically, to assert legal claims arising from U.S. takings of recognized Indian
title. See Susan Lope, Indian Giver: The Illusion of Effective Legal Redress for Native American Land Claims, 23 S.W.U.L.
REV. 331 (1994) (evaluating such claims).
135
See Atkinson, supra note 45, at 398 (noting that due to Allotment many reservations are checkerboards of U.S. and Indian
land, with some even populated mainly by non-Indians).
136
Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246, 256, 261 (1989).
137
More than half of the U.S. land mass was purchased at an average price of pennies per acre, while another 300 million acres
were taken without compensation and another 700 million acres are claimed by the U.S. although it has taken no action to
extinguish Indian title. See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States , 58 N.D. L. REV. 8-9
(1982). Moreover, all of “Indian Country”, a legal term-of-art meaning essentially lands within the territorial limits of an Indian
reservation, is now either trust land owned by the U.S. or non-trust land permanently Indian-occupied but subject to
Congressional plenary power to restrict alienation and use. See 18 U.S.C.A. §1151 (1994) (defining “Indian Country”); In sum,
the U.S. owns superior title to all land within its borders, and efforts to reacquire Indian land are vigorously opposed by all levels
of government. From the Indian viewpoint, non-Indians not only shamelessly “gorg[e] themselves on the spoils of old wars” but
remain unrepentant, as evinced by ongoing land seizures. Atkinson, supra note 45, at 381.
138
See, e.g., Maine Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §1721 et seq. (1980) (providing recognition and $81.5
million for purchase of 300,000 acres to Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet). While the U.S. has restored 500,000 acres
since 1970, this represents .05% of the two billion acres under Indian possession at First Contact. Newton, supra note 120, at 47.
139
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980) (reiterating that nonconsensual transfers of Indian land to third parties
th
are insulated from the Takings Clause of the 5 Amendment provided the U.S. acts as tribal guardian, rather than as sovereign).
Recently, several courts have mitigated the scope of plenary power marginally by requiring that the U.S. demonstrate a rational
connection between a proposed legislative enactment and fulfillment of a “unique obligation toward the Indians” under the trust
th
doctrine. See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9
Cir. 1997). Still, no court has ever set aside an exercise of plenary power as unconstitutional.
140
See Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing the Sovereignty of Native American Indian Nations, 76 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 745, 781 (1999) (noting recent expropriations of Indian land), Newton, supra note 120, at 473 (chronicling
post-World War II expropriations of Indian land). Moreover, tribal efforts to aggregate land parcels fractured by Allotment and
other federal policies are kept at bay only by the occasional intervention of the judicial branch. See, e.g., Babbit v. Youpee, 519
U.S. 234 (1997) (holding a provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 96 Stat. 2519, 25 U.S.C. 2206, prohibiting the
descent or devise of small fractional interests in allotments and providing that such fractional interest would escheat back to
tribes, unconstitutional as a taking of private property without compensation).
141
Singer, supra note 88, at 487. Remedial legislation designed to enforce the legal equality of “all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States” with respect to the “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of . . . property “ and
the “right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property” renders the legal burden all the more
indefensible. 42 U.S.C. §§1981-1982 (“Civil Rights Act of 1866”). Perhaps the only way to harmonize the statutes with the
burdens upon Indian property is to deny that Indians are persons within the meaning of the Constitution.
142
Ethnocide is defined as “any act which has the aim or effect of depriving [indigenous people] of their ethnic characteristics or
cultural identity [or] any form of forced assimilation or integration, [such as the] imposition of foreign life-styles.”
14

With its Manifest Destiny secured, the U.S, heretofore oriented toward the physical separation
and extermination of indigenous people, changed tacks to follow the prevailing political winds,143 and
U.S. Indian policy adopted a treble action agenda: liquidation of Indian culture,144 eradication of tribal
145

self-government, and forced assimilation of “civilized” Indians, shorn of cultural and social
attachments, into the body politic.146 These interrelated policies painted Indian tribes as targets for a
sinister “genocide-at-law”:147 promising to free “backward” Indians from an outmoded past and endow
them with “civilization,” “education,” and “prosperity,”148 the BIA149 introduced religious missionaries to
dissolve the glue of Indian society.
1. Cultural Liquidation
a. “Kill the Indian to Save the Man”150
Of all the processes engineered to strip away Indian culture, perhaps the most nefarious was
Congressional funding of religious schools geared toward the substitution of Euro-American, Christian
culture in its stead.151 Beginning in the late 19th century, Indian children were spirited off to boarding
schools where their hair was cut, their tribal clothing was exchanged for Western garb, and harsh abuses
were meted out for speaking tribal languages or engaging in customary religious practices.152 During their
residence, Indian children were prohibited from visiting their relatives, who, as a result, they often did not
see for years.153 Removed Indian children, and their descendants down through the generations, have
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous
People, at 6, P5, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1989/33 (1989).
143
See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Progressive-Era Bureaucrats and the Unity of Twentieth-Century Indian Policy, 15 AM.
th
INDIAN. Q. 1, 10 (1991) (identifying liberal humanist intellectuals as responsible for transformation of late-19 century Indian
policy).
144
Culture can be defined as a “set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other
groups and orient their behavior which is transmitted from one generation to the next and shapes interactions with others and the
environment[.]” Guy O. Faure & Gunnar Sjostedt, Culture and Negotiation: An Introduction, in CULTURE AND
NEGOTIATION 1, 3 (Guy O. Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1993). As such, “[e]ach culture . . . records . . . experiences in
ways that provide meaning, guidance and codes of rectitude that serve as compasses for the individual as he or she navigates the
vicissitudes of life[.]” See W. Michael Reisman, International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV 25,
25 (1996). While culture is germane to the constitution of group identities, it is particularly so for Indian tribes: a communal
culture, constituted by language, law, music, dance, religion, history, and worldview, touches every facet of Indian life and serves
as a template for determining and patterning Indian behavior. See Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures:
Sacred Sites and Communal Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691, 703 (1993) (“[Indians] without communal culture are not whole. They
are, as one Indian leader derisively put it, ‘just people’ and nothing more.”). Indian culture, thus construed, can be analogized to
tribal property entitled to defense as such. See Christine Zuni Cruz, On the Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557, 566 (1999) (“ownership of cultural property may actually be a . . . right, not unlike a
right to speak a certain language or practice a religion[.]”). For a discussion of Indian culture as a property right, see, e.g., Walter
R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights v. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural
Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 437, 441-51 (1986).
145
The term “self-government” refers to the autonomous determination of the institutions, structures, and processes of political
organization, economic development, and legal regulation.
146
See Fenton, supra note 70, at 81 (analyzing 1871-1934 federal Indian policy as acquisition of Indian land, destruction of Indian
political leadership, and assimilation of Indians).
147
See Strickland, supra note 55, at 718 (coining the term “genocide-at-law”).
148
Barsh, supra note 143, at 10.
149
The BIA is the executive agency responsible for U.S. relations with the tribes and for discharge of the trust responsibility.
150
In 1892, Captain Richard Henry Pratt, founder of the Carlisle Industrial Indian School, opined that “all the Indian there is in
the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save the man.” Cited in Atkinson, supra note 55, at 392.
151
See Jorge Noriega, American Indian Education in the United States: Indoctrination for Subordination to Colonialism 380-81
in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA [M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) [hereinafter JAIMES] (noting that boarding school
curricula stressed Anglo-American, while stifling Indian, languages, cultures, and religions).
152
See id. at 371 (stating that Indian children in boarding schools were subjected to beatings, whippings, and sexual abuse well
th
into the 20 century); see also Tsosie, supra note 68, at 1663 (terming this forcible process whereby full Indian participation in,
and knowledge of, their culture was denied beginning at an early age by non-Indians as “natal alienation”); ROBERT A
TRENNERTA, JR., THE PHOENIX INDIAN SCHOOL: FORCED ASSIMILATION IN ARIZONA, 1891-1935 (1988).
153
See Pommersheim, supra note 136, at 256-57 (noting that denial of visitation advanced the process of assimilation).
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typically lost the use of their languages, been denied cultural knowledge, and been deprived of
opportunities to take on tribal responsibilities.154
b. American Crusade: Eradication of Indian Religion
While Indian children underwent forced conversions, the U.S. posted Christian missionaries to
the reservations as Indian agents with orders to ban tribal religions, initiate Christianization, and pacify
political discourse.155 At the behest of the Indian agents, Congress launched an assault upon Indian
religion with laws156 that weakened “marriage, family and clan relationships, the distribution of property,
and social and political organization.”157 Courts of Indian Offenses (“CIO”) enforced these stringent
social control mechanisms.158 In arguing for the suppression of tribal dancing and feasting, the Secretary
of the Interior proclaimed that “[i]f it is the purpose of the [U.S.] to civilize the Indians, they must be
th
compelled to desist from . . . savage rites and heathenish customs.”159 For most of the 20 century, non-

Indian “cultural game wardens”160 circumscribed the legal exercise of Indian religion.161 Despite the 1978
passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act [“AIRFA”] establishing the policy of the U.S. to
“protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right . . . to believe, express, and exercise . . .
traditional religions,”162 in practice Indian religions—particularly when they involve the hunting of
charismatic mega-fauna or the use of controlled substances—have proven too enigmatic for non-Indian
jurists to admit within the meaning of “religion” as enunciated in the Bill of Rights.163 For Indian
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See Sarah Pritchard, The Stolen Generation and Reparations, 21 U. NEW S. WALES L. REV. 259, 263 (1998) (discussing
deprivation of cultural patrimony occasioned by removal of indigenous children); see also Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with
Words: Native Americans’ Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 905-908 (1999)
(detailing effects of suppression of Indian languages).
155
See VINE DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 108 (1969).
156
By 1892 the BIA Commissioner had listed the following offenses as within the jurisdiction of the CIO: “participating in dances
or feasts, entering into plural . . . marriages, acting as medicine men [i.e., practicing Indian religion], destroying property of other
Indians, engaging in immorality, [and] intoxication.” Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy
Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1033 (1995).
157
Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191,
229 (194).
158
By 1900 CIO/CFR Courts had been created on the majority of reservations, extending the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. See
Newton, supra note 210, at 1034. Judges were chosen from the ranks of “assimilated” Indians who were willing to cut their hair,
wear western attire, and accept allotments. See Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and
Clinical Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 127, 139 n.28 (1999).
159
Newton, supra note 156, at 1033.
160
Rosen, supra note 40, at 227.
161
Instances of the denial of the right to practice Indian religion are legion. For several generations the BIA suppressed Indian
religious practices, particularly the Sun Dance, as promoting “superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idlreness, . . . and shiftless
indifference to family welfare.” COHEN, supra note 129, at 175 (citing BIA Commissioner in 1921 congressional testimony).
Rigid proscriptions of all manifestations of Indian religion have been vigorously enforced by all three branches of the federal
government for more than a century. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and the Holy Ghost: The Echoes of NineteenthCentury Christianization Policies in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 792
(1997) (chronicling prohibition of all forms of traditional Indian religious practice). In recent times denials have often involved
the right to gather or use ceremonial natural materials. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (finding in
legislative history and text of a federal criminal statute extending protection to eagles clear evidence of Congressional intent to
exercise plenary power and abrogate right of the Yankton Sioux to quiet and undisturbed possession of their reservation, to
include reserved right to hunt eagles); Sharon O’Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies
and Families, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 315 (1984) (noting international travel restrictions and domestic laws prohibiting
importation of flora and fauna prevent Indians from crossing national boundaries to gather or trade sacred items); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (discussed infra at note 219).
162
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)
(declaring as grounds for protecting and preserving expression of Indian religions against infringement by state action that “the
religious practices of the American Indian . . . are an integral part of their culture, tradition and heritage[.]”).
163
Racism, paternalism, and romanticism conspire to prevent protection of Indian religious freedom except when it is possible to
cram Indian claims into the pigeonholes of the Bill of Rights and the European-derived values and traditions supporting notions
of what religion should be—organized churches, formal institutions, a separation between the church and state, and a hierarchical
16
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claimants, who have not won a single religious freedom case and may not celebrate the sacraments of
their faith without threat of prosecution for violation of controlled-substance or species-protection
legislation, the American tradition of religious freedom has been a “cruel hoax.”165
2. Suppression of Indian Self-Government
U.S. Indian policy has long disabled autonomous determination of the political organization,
economic development, and legal regulation of Indian tribes and people, principally by disintegrating
tribal institutions and supplanting them with Euro-American forms of governance. From the dark ages of
the Allotment Era to the present, Indian legal institutions have presented an attractive point-of-entry to
agents of forced social evolution.
a. Legal Imperialism
Although no Indian tribe had codified a body of written law as of 1776, many tribes had kinshipbased rules of conduct and belief that conditioned members to adhere to sacred values of order, harmony,
and peace.166 Intra-tribal disputes were typically resolved not through formal adjudication but rather with
the aid of respected elders who would guide disputants to a restorative compromise. “[T]hough it

relationship between the deity and worshippers. See GETCHES, SUPRA NOTE 110, AT 764 (explaining inability of non-indigenous
judges to translate Indian claims under AIRFA into cognizable claims). To Getches,
Indian religious life does not include the existence of a church, periodic meetings, ritual, and identifiable
dogma. Instead, there is a pervasive quality to Indian religion which gives all aspects of Indian life and
society a spiritual significance . . . Judicial understanding and protection of Indian religion are hindered by a
general unfamiliarity with Indian spiritual life, and perhaps even intolerance for religious beliefs and practices
not succinctly defined by the ancient writings or a central authority familiar to European-developed religious
traditions.
Id. Conflicts over land use exacerbate judicial unwillingness to draw Indian religions within the penumbra of the Constitution.
As Deloria notes,
America is content with religious denominations which are capable of squeezing their entire experience with
land into a city block, into a pew, and into a pulpit, leaving plenty of environmental “elbow room” for the
business of the real world. As long as our religions tow the line insofar as they expect land to be sacrificed to
our needs, we are happy . . . But when a religion dares to turn the tables and encourages humans to make
medicine, prayers, and sacrifices in behalf of other living things, we feel violated, bullied by “an agenda,”
and even irritated at such “primitive” ideas which hold “progress” hostage.
Vine Deloria, Jr., Is Religion Possible? An Evaluation of Present Efforts to Revive Traditional Religions, 8 WICAZO SA REV.
38-39 (1992).
164
See Sharon O’Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 27, 29-30 (Christopher Very, ed., 1995)]; see also New Mexico Navajo Ranchers’ Ass’n v.
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 850 F.2d 729 (D.C. 1988) (obligating U.S. to consider impact of actions on Indian religion but not
obligating consultation with tribes whose religion was threatened with imminent destruction of its material foundations).
165
Dean B. Suagee, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples at the Dawn of the Solar Age, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 671, 712
(1992). Not only did AIRFA provide little intellectual support for the finding that Indian religions were “religions” with respect
to the Constitution, but it was passed as a resolution without concrete mandate other than a requirement that federal agencies
evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with Indian religious leaders and report findings to Congress. Laura Nader
& Jay Ou, Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native American Law, 23 OK. CITY L. REV. 13, 22-23 (1998).
Moreover, judicial interpretation further guts constitutional protection of Indian religious practice: in 1988 the Court, finding no
independent cause of action arising under AIRFA, upheld U.S. logging and construction activities on National Forest lands used
for religious purposes by several tribes, even while conceding it was undisputed that the activities could have “devastating effects
on . . . Indian religious practices,” on the theory that to find otherwise would be tantamount to permitting a religious servitude on
public lands. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53 (1988) (O’Connor, J.) (“Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area those
rights do not divest the Government of its rights to use what is, after all, its land.”). In 1990 the Court refused to apply the
“compelling state interest” test developed under the First Amendment to a Oregon prohibition on the use of peyote applied, in the
case at bar, to religious practice by members of the Native American Church: a majority held it would be “courting anarchy” to
“open the prospects of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind”
and that “leaving accommodation to the political practice” is the appropriate means to determine the state interest in regulating
Indian religion. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77(1990).
166
Ken Traisman, Native Law: Law and Order Among Eighteenth-Century Cherokee, Great Plains, Central Prairie, and
Woodland Indians, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 273, 274 (1981).
17

appeared to the casual white observer that anarchy reigned,”167 spiritual consensus produced a coherent
jurisprudence. Despite retention of nearly exclusive subject matter and personal jurisdiction to the
territorial limits of their reservations even as of the late 19th century,168 Indian tribes, with no easily
identifiable legal institutions, procedures, or records, were beset by a constellation of religious
170

proselytizers and BIA agents who, concluding they were without law,169 imposed legal “civilization.”
171

The 1883 case of Ex parte Crow Dog, in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the federal
conviction of an Indian charged with the murder of another Indian, induced Congress to extend the
complete coercive power of federal criminal law to the reservations. Determined to rectify the “savage
172

quality” of tribal law, Congress applied “white man’s morality” with the Major Crimes Act of 1885 to
expressly establish concurrent federal jurisdiction over major felonies committed by Indians on
173

reservations regardless of the status of their victims.

Legal challenges failed to reestablish tribal legal

self-determination but provided the judiciary occasion to further undergird plenary power.174 The
paternalistic assault upon Indian legal sovereignty, joined on the religious front with the adoption of the
CIO/CFR courts, intensified during the Great Depression with the passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 [“IRA”].175 Although the IRA expressly recognized that tribes might create their own
177

courts176 and enact their own laws, the legislation imposed BIA-drafted boilerplate constitutions178 that
167

WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 11 (1966).
th
Individual federal statutes had provided for piecemeal federal prosecution of crimes occurring on Indian land since the 18
century. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (extending federal jurisdiction to crimes committed on reservations by
non-Indians) (considerably revised and codified at 18 U.S.C. §1152 (1994). Still, the legal regulation of reservation transactions
not involving non-Indians was left intact well into the late 19th century, save for the removal of virtually all tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. See, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (permitting Colorado to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over crimes of non-Indians against other non-Indians occurring on the Ute Reservation as no exception was made to
territorial jurisdiction on Colorado’s admission to Union).
169
See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 34, at 56-57 (contrasting U.S. practice with international practice of recognizing validity and
legitimacy of indigenous law).
170
See Harring, supra note 157, at 224 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz in 1879 report to Congress) (“If the Indians
are to be advanced in civilized habits it is essential that they be accustomed to the government of law[.]”)
171
109 U.S. 556 (1883). Spotted Tail, an authoritarian Brule Sioux chief who had staked his political fortunes on accommodation
with U.S. authorities, was shot and killed on the reservation by his political rival, Crow Dog. After a peacemaking ceremony, the
family of Spotted Tail agreed to accept a payment of $600, eight horses, and one blanket to resolve the dispute. Harring, supra
note 157, at 205. Despite the satisfaction of the entire Brule tribe, the case presented federal authorities the pretext for extension
of federal criminal law to Indians. Id. at 200-01. Crow Dog was arrested, tried in the Territorial Court of South Dakota, and
sentenced to hang by an all-white jury. Id. at 204-12. However, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding that the
Brule had the sovereign right to resolve disputes wholly internal to the tribe. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567-68, 571 (refusing to
extend U.S. criminal law to acts occurring on Indian reservations on the ground that to do so would “measur[e] the red man’s
revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”). Nonetheless, for a white majority Crow Dog was a “legal atrocity”
inasmuch as an Indian killer had “escaped punishment.” Harring, supra note 157, at 191, 194.
172
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571. As Rep. Cutcheon (D-Mich.) stated before the Indian Affairs Committee in 1884:
[A]n Indian, when he commits a crime, should be recognized as a criminal, and so treated under the laws of
the land. I do not believe we shall ever succeed in civilizing the Indian race until we teach them regard for
the law, and show them that they are not only responsible to the law but amenable to its penalties. It is an
infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this nation, that there should be anywhere within its boundaries a
body of people who can, with absolute impunity, commit the crime of murder[.]
16 CONG. REC. 934 (1885).
173
Act of Mar. 3, 1885, Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1994)
and expanded to 14 felonies from original 7). The Major Crimes Act subjects Indians charged with serious felonies to exclusive
federal criminal jurisdiction regardless of the place of the alleged offense or the identity of the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
174
See, e.g., U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding, in suit challenging Major Crimes Act as an unconstitutional extension
of federal criminal jurisdiction over murder on an Indian reservation), that Congress has plenary power, immune from judicial
review, to exercise authority over Indians as it sees fit, for their own “well-being”).
175
Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §1401(b) (1994).
176
Although the IRA appeared to encourage tribal legal self-determination, tribal courts created under the IRA were merely
revamped CIO/CFR Courts, with American substantive law governing process and imposing a regime of individual rights hostile
to traditional Indian legal systems. See generally Porter, supra note 34.
18
168

created strange new substantive and procedural obligations. Moreover, after the passage of Public Law
179

280 in 1954, providing that specified States could unilaterally accept concurrent jurisdiction over Indian
territory within their borders, the entire body of State civil and criminal law was extended to classes of
cases involving Indians.180 Fearing that failure to create acceptable tribal courts would result in States
181
taking jurisdiction over all cases occurring on reservations, and understanding that review of the

exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian affairs was an exercise in futility, tribes begrudgingly
implemented constitutions and adversarial justice systems.182
The penultimate blow fell in 1968 when the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”)183 imposed many of
the individualist strictures of the U.S. Constitution on tribal governments184 and smoothed the way for
what Indian activists branded “white-man’s justice.”185 Although the ICRA amended Public Law 280 to
require tribal consent for the exercise of State jurisdiction and left interpretation of the legislation to the
tribes themselves,186 by the early 1970s pre-Columbian methods of social control had displaced traditional
justice from tribal courts where an Anglo-American adversarial legal system had sunken roots. BIAdrafted codes permitted tribal court judges to apply tribal statutes, yet federal and State laws were
supreme,187 and federal judicial review steered tribal jurisprudence into lockstep conformity.188 When in
177

See 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(c) (1997).
See THE ROAD TO WOUNDED KNEE 7 (Robert Burnette & John Koster eds., 1974) [hereinafter BURNETTE & KOSTER]
(noting that under the IRA as implemented, only standardized, authoritarian tribal constitutionsthat mirrored a BIA -promulgated
model providing for no separation of powers or branches and incorporating harsh restrictions on freedom of action in trade,
property, land, and political associations, were ratified). Furthermore, constitutions imposed by the IRA subject tribal
governments to majority rule principles and grant the the Secretary of the Interior or his delegate, the BIA Commissioner, veto
power over almost all important tribal decisions. See Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community v. Babbitt, 107 F.3d
th
667 (8 Cir. 1997) (upholding review and veto powers of Secretary of the Interior over tribal actions).
179
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. 280, No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A § 1161-1162 (1994),
25 U.S.C.A. §§1321-22, & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)). Although it expressly disclaimed any grant to the States of power to tax
Indian lands held in federal trust or to abrogate Indian reserved rights under treaties, Public Law 280 extended State civil and
criminal jurisdiction to most Indian tribes in California, Nebraska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Alaska was added in
1958. See id. Perhaps just as significantly in terms of the deevolution of authority and responsibility, Public Law 280 also
shifted responsibility for administration and funding trust-based Indian entitlement programs to the States. Id.
180
See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (upholding application of State law to Indians absent a governing federal statute
without explicitly overturning Worcester holding that State law cannot be applied due to its harmful effect on tribal sovereignty).
181
See, e.g., Nancy A. Costello, Walking Together in a Good Way: Indian Peacemaker Courts in Michigan, 76 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 875, 896 (1999) (stating that Navajo Tribal Courts were created to exclude State court jurisdiction).
182
See COHEN, supra note 129, at 332-35 (detailing U.S. role in the development of tribal courts).
183
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 [“ICRA”], Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
(1994)). ICRA limits tribal powers to define and punish offenses and imposes substantive due process provisions of Article III
th
th
th
th
th
th
and the 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , and 14 Amendments of the Constitution upon tribal governments. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
184
Indian tribes were not subject to Constitutional restrictions prior to ICRA. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding
that Indian tribes, as they are not States within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, are not subject to its restrictions).
185
Porter, supra note 176, at 271-72; ICRA was foreign to sacred tribal traditions of fairness and justice, and its reference to “due
process,” “equal protection,” “speedy trial,” and “freedom of speech” were an unwelcome intrusion on tribal sovereignty. See
Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile
Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 115 (1998) (indicating ICRA “significantly altered the
focus . . . from the tribal community towards the individual [.]”).
186
See 25 U.S.C.A. §§1321-22, 1326. Congress specifically provided that interpretation of the ICRA was to be left to tribes and
admonished that its purpose was protection of individual rights as against the administration of tribal justice without eroding the
parameters of tribal sovereignty. Laurence, supra note 251, at 115. Furthermore, the sole remedy ICRA provides for a tribal
member contesting the legality of his detention by a tribal court is a writ of habeas corpus. See 25 U.S.C. A. §1303 (1994).
187
See 28 U.S.C.A. §1360 (c) (requiring State courts exercising jurisdiction in Indian Country to apply tribal laws and customs
only “if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law”).
188
Newton, supra note 79, at 1038. One of the most powerful instruments in enforcing control is the doctrine of comity. A longstanding practice of American courts is the denial of comity to tribal court judgments on the ground that tribal justices systems do
not accord sufficient due process, which denial courts of the United States are swift to identify where tribal justice departs
“significantly” from practices "commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon society.” Bird v. Glacier Electric Coop.,Inc ., 255 F.3d
th
1136, 1141 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding individual rights to due process violated by closing argument in Tribal Court referencing
history of white oppression against Indians). Although U.S. courts are quick to disavow any interest in judicial paternalism in
19
178

189

190

1978 Oliphant denied tribes jurisdiction over the acts of non-Indians occurring on reservations, a new
191

generation of critical jurisprudence began to question the foundations of federal Indian law.

Although tribal proactivity and federal interposition hold State law partly at bay,192 at present
Indian tribes may exercise jurisdiction solely over consenting tribal members on fragmented remnants of
former tribal holdings.193 Even this vestige of sovereignty is threatened by the plenary power to extend all
federal, and, by inaction, State laws to the reservations.194 Rediscovery of tribal dispute resolution
methods after a century of legal imperialism, and their reintroduction in Indian Country as an assertion of
legal autonomy, are pressing concerns, yet reacquisition of Indian law is inadequate by itself to offset the
crushing force of federal Indian law, a mechanism “genocidal in both its practice and intent[.]”195
b. Political Domination
Although Indian tribes are separate sovereigns in retention of all rights and powers not explicitly
ceded to the U.S. by treaty196 or abrogated by explicit legislative intent,197 U.S. Indian policy has been

derogation of tribal self-government, denial of recognition of tribal court judgments utterly neuters the legal autonomy of Indian
tribes, particularly with respect to their transborder legal contacts. See id. at 1141-43.
189
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
190
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (denying Indian tribes inherent power to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land within reservation).
191
See Newton, supra note 79, at 1036. “Federal Indian law,” as distinguished from “tribal law,” is the body of U.S. statutes,
doctrines, and caselaw that governs relations with Indian tribes.
192
See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (stating that the Indian Commerce Clause divested States “of
virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes”); Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (ruling that to permit States to
exercise jurisdiction over Indians where “essential tribal relations” are involved would “infringe on the right of the Indians to
govern themselves.”); but see County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992) (allowing States to tax reservation lands held in fee); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (allowing States to tax cigarette sales on reservations); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1980)
(allowing State regulation of on-reservation liquor sales); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 44 (Indian Commerce Clause does not grant
Congress power to abrogate 11th Amendment immunity of a State from suits by tribes, regardless of whether congressional intent
to do so is clear). The contentious battle between tribes and States over the precise boundaries of Indian legal autonomy, fought
increasingly on the plain of taxation, continues. See Robert A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights: Are
They Historical Illusions?. 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 141 (1995-96) (predicting future State attempts to tax Indian tribes).
193
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation.”). Although the Montana Court recognized tribal competence to regulate aspects of the dealings of
non-Indians who enter consensual relationships with or threaten the political or physical well-being of the tribe, subsequent
decisions eroded these inherent powers still further. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (1997) (“Montana thus
described a general rule that, absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of
nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation.”). Presently, the presumption is that Indian sovereignty over Indian land is
absent unless Congress explicitly legislates otherwise. Id.
194
See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (providing that States may exercise jurisdiction over
Indian tribes where federal law does not preempt exercise of such power, the conduct of non-Indians is at issue, and tribal selfgovernment will not be impeded). Although the complex web of jurisdictional issues exceeds the scope of this Article, the
general pattern is the transfer of legal sovereignty from Indian tribes to federal and State governments.
195
Robert J. Williams, Encounters on the Frontier of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous
Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 662-65 (implicating federal Indian law in displacement of peoples,
dissolution of tribal institutions, domination of legal systems, and disabling of land title and cultural practice).
196
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)). As separate
sovereigns predating the U.S. Constitution, Indian tribes possess inherent, residual powers of sovereignty not deriving from
Congressional grants. See Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 16. These inherent recognized powers include, inter alia, powers to establish a
tribal government, determine tribal membership (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)), administer justice,
th
exclude persons from the reservation (see Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9 Cir. 1976)), charter business organizations,
exercise police power, invoke sovereign immunity (Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49 (1978)), levy taxes (see Confederated
Colville Tribes, 477 U.S. at 152-55), and regulate domestic relations (see Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). Still,
although tribes retain many of the trappings of sovereign nations, the exercise of inherent tribal powers may be abrogated or
restricted by a treaty or law or, in limited circumstances, by State laws. See Atkinson, supra note 55, at 427.
197
See Dion, 476 U.S. at 734. In recent years, the legal doctrine that the powers lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not
delegated but rather inherent concomitants of a limited sovereignty never extinguished by the U.S., has been under threat. See
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (dissenting) (rights reserved by Indian tribes under treaties may be “temporary and
precarious” if not explicitly guaranteed in perpetuity by their plain language) (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)).
20

198

generally hostile to the right of Indian tribes to self-govern as politically distinct communities.

If the

th

theme of the 19 century was eradication of Indians and the seizure of their land, the motif of the 20th
century was the destruction by law of tribal sovereignty. With the passage of the IRA, Indian tribes,
199

traditionally hyperdemocratic and consensus-driven institutions, were reconstituted and subjected to the
veto power of the Secretary of the Interior;200 subsequent legislative and judicial action has stripped Indian
tribes of control over their form, property, and powers.201 Relations with post-IRA Indian tribes, rather
than proceed as if between mutual sovereigns, are conducted largely through a welter of executive
agencies.202 As a result, the terms and conditions of Indian existence are frequently dictated from
Washington, rather than debated on the reservations.203 Federal agencies to which Congress delegates
power smother tribes under a blanket of regulation204 that, although it provides the means of subsistence,
suppresses traditional modes of social control and value allocation, and the Secretary of the Interior looms
large over every aspect of tribal life.205 A dawning recognition that Indians are entitled to self-govern has
spurred calls to end the fundamental asymmetry of U.S.-Indian relations. Nevertheless, decades after
introduction of the federal policy of “Indian Self-Determination,”206 tribes remain politically subordinate
207

to and thus economically dependent upon the U.S.

198

U.S. hostility to indigenous political forms found expression in policy statements supporting Allotment. See ANDERSON,
supra note 203, at 94 (quoting BIA Commissioner) (“[E])xisting forms of Indian government which [are] menacing the peace . . .
and irritating their white neighbors, should be replaced by a regularly organized Territorial form of government[.]”)
199
LARRY W. BURT, TRIBALISM IN CRISIS: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 1953-1961 (1982); see also BURNETTE &
KOSTER, supra note 178, at 15 (describing tribal governments prior to 1934 as council democracies advised by elders that
operated on principles of consensus and voluntary compliance with decisions).
200
See id. at 183 (noting that BIA-adopted constitutions grant the Secretary of the Interior veto power over most tribal actions and
decisions). For an opposing view, see NICHOLAS J. SPAETH et al., eds., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 21-23
(1993) (suggesting the IRA replaced federal with tribal governance).
201
See LEGTERS & LYDEN, supra note 112, at 6 (noting that as a consequence of the legislative and judicial diminution of their
sovereignty, Indian tribes are now often junior partner in the hierarchy of federal, State, local, and tribal governments).
202
See Thomas Biolsi, “Indian Self-Government” as a Technique of Domination, 15 AM. IND. Q. 23 (1991) (describing U.S.
policy of “indirect rule” through nexus of federal agencies and reorganized tribal structures). Indirect rule imposes fiscal,
cultural, and social costs: increased tribal bureaucratization associated with governance from afar consumes nearly half of tribal
budgets, far more than that allocated to economic development. WELLS, supra note 106, at 17.
203
See ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIAN’S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 72 (1971) (quoting
National Indian Youth Congress President Clyde Warrior in 1967 address) (“We are not allowed to make those basic human
choices and decisions about our personal life and about the destiny of our communities . . . Our choices are made for us . . . by
federal administrators, bureaucrats, and their ‘yes men,’ euphemistically called tribal governments.”); see also Atkinson, supra
note 45, at 393 (describing exclusion of Indian organizations and individuals from agency planning); TERRY L. ANDERSON
SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS? AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 148 (1995) (noting
that rather than foster time-honored education, cultural expression, and economic development, federal Indian agencies force
tribal leaders to lobby for federal funding for social programs developed without significant Indian participation).
204
Under the trust doctrine, the U.S. funds and participates in the management of a welter of complex statutory programs,
involving education, health, social services, economic development, and resource management, on Indian reservations. See infra
at note 219 (listing programs). Although Indian participation in the development and administration of these programs shapes
them to fit tribal needs and values, the parameters within which such local influence are exercised are determined by Congress.
205
ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 247 (noting veto power of Secretary of Interior over tribal decisions).
206
In 1970 Congress delegated authority to the executive to enter contracts with Indian tribes in which federal Indian programs
would be funded by the U.S. but responsibility for planning and administration would be assumed by tribal governments. Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 [“ISDEA”], 25 U.S.C.A. §450 et seq. (1975. Support for Indian SelfDetermination took on a bipartisan tint in the early 1980s. See PRESIDENT REAGAN, STATEMENT ON INDIAN POLICY,
PUB. PAPERS OF RONALD REAGAN 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) (“Our policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian Tribes on a
government-to-government basis”). Congress authorized development of enhanced self-governance plans under the rubric of a
“New Federalism” advanced by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs. See Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, § 209, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2296 (1988) (allowing tribes to assume
administration of some BIA programs). Nevertheless, federal Indian agencies remained mired in patterns of costly and
unresponsive provision of services. PEVAR, supra note 80, at 32 (noting investigations implicating BIA as primary deterrent to
development of Indian self-government in areas of employment, housing, and health care). Throughout the 1980s Indian SelfDetermination simply decentralized the fiduciary relationship, and by the start of the 1990s both major political parties, eager to
decrease the financial drain of Indian welfare programs, cut aid while pressing Indian tribes enter the world of private enterprise.
21

c. Ethnodevelopmental Suppression
Despite significant resource endowments,208 many Indian tribes209 remain ensnared in a web of
economic dependence,210 institutionalized domination,211 geographic dislocation, and gross
.212

undercapitalization.

Although the non-legal obstacles to Indian economic independence, the first and

foremost goal of tribal governments,213 are very real, the constraints imposed by federal Indian law are
even more formidable. To wit, the U.S. holds trust title to Indian lands and resources,214 and Indians
cannot sell, lease, or borrow against their property without the express approval of the Secretary of the
Interior.215 As the very question of secretarial approval introduces political uncertainty,216 trust-based
land-tenure constraints diminish the relative output-values of land-intensive enterprises such as
agriculture, ranching, and resource development.217 Moreover, U.S. management of Indian resources

DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36, at 7. Although the Clinton Administration urged federal Indian agencies to adopt the
Reagan principle of mutual sovereignty, many Indian tribes remain, paradoxically, under pupilage. See WELLS, supra note 106,
at 9-10 (elaborating paradox wherein continued federal funding is necessary to implement Indian Self-Determination).
207
Empirical evidence suggests that, for Indian tribes, political domination produces economic dependence. See ANDERSON,
supra note 203, at 245 (“Economy follows sovereignty in Indian Country . . . The most striking characteristic of . . . successful
tribes . . . is that they have aggressively made the tribe itself the effective decision maker[.]”). Nonetheless, economics and
politics exert reciprocal influence, and economic dependence precludes the free exercise of Indian sovereignty. See John C.
Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495, 499 (1991) (“Indian
economic development may be less about creating wealth than it is about creating the conditions for political power[.]”).
208
The irony of Indian poverty is rendered all the more acute by reference to the abundant, sustainable resources in Indian
Country. Timber, hydroelectric sources, grazing land, minerals, oil and gas, and wildlife abound. However, the U.S., as trustee,
controls leasing and production of these assets. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 56, at 239-42 (noting that federal management of the
$27 billion of mineral assets on the Crow Reservation currently yields a return of only .01 percent to the tribe).
209
The conditions of each reservation are as distinct as are the more than five hundred tribes; several “report a sense of pride and
accomplishment” in recent development of autonomous programs which include “law enforcement, education, organic farming,
sustainable-resource logging, recycling plants, construction, environmental repair industries, language and culture academies, arts
and crafts workshops, casinos, buffalo ranches, resorts, solar and wind energy production, computer assembly, tribal courts,
veterans affairs offices, housing, road improvement, sanitation, etc.” Atkinson, supra note 45, at 430.
210
See Daniel Boxberger, Individualism or Tribalism? The “Dialectic” of Indian Policy, 15 AM. IND. Q. 29, 29 (1991) (noting
“complex factors that have shaped tribal institutions . . . [as] dependent, internal colonies”); see also ROBERT H. WHITE,
TRIBAL ASSETS: THE REBIRTH OF NATIVE AMERICA 7 (1990) (“Less than 10 percent of [Indian] communities have . . .
any control over their economic fate[.]”). In addition to dependence for social services, many tribes rely upon low-wage federal
and State jobs and the export of nonrenewable natural resources for subsistence. WELLS, supra note 106, at 361-371.
211
See Mohawk, supra note 207, at 496-97 (suggesting Indian economic development is hostage to BIA interference with
organization of independent political communities).
212
See Robert Williams, Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian Nations, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 335, 343-352
(1985) (relating remoteness of reservations from centers of commerce and education to difficulty in accessing markets, capital,
and managerial expertise).
213
WHITE, supra note 210, at 273. Admittedly, tribal governments do not always speak with a single voice as to the appropriate
developmental path: there is a broad intra- and inter-tribal diversity of opinion as to the objectives, pace, and direction of Indian
economic development. Still, a pan-Indian near-consensus favors independent Indian allocation, free from non-Indian mediation,
of the cultural values informing Indian economic life. ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 246.
214
The U.S. defines the trust responsibility as the obligation to assert plenary power “to ensure the survival and welfare of
Indian[s]” by “provid(ing) those services required to protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and self-government and “to
raise the[ir] standard of living . . . to a level comparable to the non-Indian society.” WELLS, supra note 106, at 19.
215
See 25 U.S.C.A. §§393, 396, 415, & 483 (1994) (providing that an Indian individual or tribe who wishes to sell, convey, lease,
or mortgage property in Indian Country for more than one year must first secure the permission of the Secretary of the Interior).
216
Justifications for congressional refusal to consign the trust doctrine to the ashcan of history focus on the claim that the trust is
necessary to protect Indians from exposure to market forces and the improvident disposal of their property. See PERRY, supra
st
note 62, at 16. However, it is questionable at best whether the increasingly sophisticated tribes of the 21 century are any longer
in need of the “protection” afforded by an inept trustee such as the U.S. has demonstrated itself to be. Critical examinations of
BIA management decisions, as well as recent caselaw, support the argument that the trust doctrine operates as legal dressing for
the assertion of federal politico-economic power for the benefit of non-Indian constituencies, such as industries that compete
against, or rely upon raw materials derived from, Indian interests. See WELLS, supra note 106, at 379 (identifying trust doctrine
as facilitating corporate exploitation of Indian lands and resources); see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-11 (D.D.C.
1999) (finding as a matter of fact that the purpose of the trust doctrine was to “deprive Indians of their native lands and rid the
nation of their tribal identity” to avail non-Indians of tribal lands and resources). Within this understanding of the trust, agency
decisions regarding Indian property are inherently governed by political considerations, rather than fiduciary concerns.
217
See ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 134 (illustrating process whereby the trust imposes opportunity costs, bureaucracy, and
dependence rather than permits self-determination).
22
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grants the U.S. paternalistic control over Indian economic destiny.

Although the U.S. is under a moral

obligation to husband Indian resources, diligently advance Indian land claims against the States, secure
adequate funding for Indian social services,219 and enhance the economic well-being of Indian people,220
221

222

federal agencies have withheld basic subsistence, mismanaged tribal resources, and violated the
animating principles of the trust with near-impunity: only in very recent years has the trust doctrine
charged the U.S. with judicially enforceable obligations apart from those incorporated in specific treaties,
statutes, or executive orders.223 Although the protective dimensions of the trust doctrine have
broadened,224 aggrieved Indian beneficiaries still lack effective legal recourse for its breach.225

218

Royalties earned from leases of rights on Indian lands are paid not to Indian individuals or tribes but are deposited by the BIA,
in theory, into trust accounts. See 25 U.S.C.A. §415 et seq. However, a 1996 federal audit discovered that the BIA could not
account for $2.4 billion in Indian monies ostensibly safeguarded in federal trust funds. See Atkinson, supra note 45 at 427.
Indian beneficiaries seeking remedies for must confront the fact that U.S. authority over Indian resources held in trust is legally
limited only by the requirement of “good faith.” See Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (holding that U.S., as trustee, may
alter the form of trust assets as long as it attempts, in good faith, to provide property of equivalent value).
219
Although the trust imposes a moral obligation upon the U.S. to provide funding for Indian social services, the process whereby
such funds are made available is a paradigm of inefficiency and paternalism: only a fraction of what Congress allots to the BIA
reaches Indian tribes, and monies are specifically earmarked for programs selected by the BIA despite tribal determinations that
funds are better allocated elsewhere. WELLS, supra note 106, at 20-21. Nevertheless, the U.S. has created a series of Indian
benefit programs that purport to uphold its obligations under the trust responsibility. See National Historic Preservation Act
4006(a)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. 470(a)-(d)(6) (providing particular protection to properties with cultural and religious importance to
Indian tribes); National Museum of the American Indian Act 1-10, 13, 16, 20 U.S.C. §80(q)-(q)(15) (1994) (creating museum
exclusively for preservation and study of history and artifacts of Indians); Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation
Act 4106(d), 21 U.S.C. 1177(d) (1994) (giving preference to grant applications aimed at combatting Indian drug abuse); Native
American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§2901-2912 (1994) (according Indian languages statutory protection); Workforce
Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C.A. §2911 (supporting Indian employment); Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§2991-2992 (1994) (creating financial and cultural benefit programs); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
25 U.S.C. §§3001-3013 (1994) (protecting Indian burial sites and remains).
220
Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 1.
221
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36, at 181 (charging both major political parties with default on trust obligations).
222
The paternalistic policies of a non-Indian majority, violative of the moral and legal imperatives arising under the trust doctrine,
add the insult of impoverishment to the injury of expropriation: the BIA arranges Indian leases, and collects their royalties and
usufructuary benefits for their “protection.” See Atkinson, supra note 45, at 405. Moreover, because all tribal land is held in
trust, leases of more than one year are prohibited without permission of the Secretary of the Interior, and funds generated from
such leases cannot be used to purchase land. U.S. mismanagement of Indian resources is of epic proportions. See, e.g., S. REP.
st
st
NO. 216, 101 Cong., 1 Sess. 105-29, 140 (1989) (documenting century of theft of Indian oil and gas). In the most recent case, a
federal court, finding the U.S. in breach of a common-law fiduciary obligation due to its “long and sorry history” of gross
mismanagement of over $500 million in 300,000 individual Indian Money Accounts, retained jurisdiction to enforce an
accounting but stopped short of ordering further remedies unauthorized by statute. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 11, sub. nom. Cobell
v. Norton, No. CIV.A.96-1285 (RCL), 2002 WL 1480903 (D.D.C.). Although the Secretary of the Interior concedes the issue of
gross federal mismanagement, the means proposed as the most cost-effective to make an accounting—statistical sampling—
would cost Indian claimants at least $70 million: whether relief will ever be afforded is uncertain, although the Court maintains
jurisdiction and defendants’ are currently required to file reports as to trust reform activities. Id.; see also Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribe of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Norton, 2002 WL 1627863 (D.D.C.) (finding case-at bar presented same questions
of law and fact as Cobell, and refusing to refer case-at-bar, and other related tribal cases, to Calendar Committee).
223
th
See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303 (9 Cir. 1997) (finding no general obligation under trust doctrine entitling
tribes to rights broader than those created by statute). Moreover, tribes must exhaust admininistrative remedies for claims of
th
breach of trust to be justiciable. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 675, 677-68 (9 Cir. 1988).
224
The full range of obligations owed under common law principles of fiduciary duty is broad. REST., (2nd), TRUSTS, §§170-72
(listing, inter alia, duties to exercise diligence and prudence, avoid conflict of interest, deal fairly, and assume liability for loss).
A few limit U.S. management of the Indian trust. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923) (construing statute
in light of trust doctrine to protect Indian right of occupancy); Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97 (judging U.S. conduct with
respect to Indians “by the most exacting fiduciary standards”); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d
st
370 (1 Cir. 1975) (enforcing fiduciary obligations to Indians). For a discussion of judicial efforts to expand enforcement, see T.
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
225
See COHEN, supra note 129, at 169 (noting full body of common-law duties and rights “does not exist between the [U.S.] and
the Indians”); Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 7-11 (holding federal courts are limited by separation of powers considerations in
reviewing executive management of Indian resources and, where not authorized by statute, cannot function as “a grievance
committee”). As of 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court has never granted relief for a breach of duty arising under the trust doctrine as
defined at common law: relief for a putative breach is available only in those limited circumstances where the U.S. acts in the
narrow role of (quasi)private, rather than public, trustee. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128 (holding when the U.S. acts generally
under the trust doctrine it “cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary”).
23
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Plenary power, as well as judicial review of its exercise, further stifles Indian economic
development by enabling Congress to terminate federal benefits227 and restrict or even abrogate Indian
rights reserved under treaties.228 Domestic lobbying to induce Congress to allow non-Indian economic
229

230

interests access to Indian resources threatens tribal sustenance and culture.

Although Indians, as prior

231

sovereigns, reserved rights in treaties to use water, hunt and fish, and engage in traditional modes of
production and worship on customary lands and waters,232 recent cases suggests these are merely
“temporary and precarious”233 privileges subject to revocation even absent explicit Congressional intent to
do so.234 The synergy of the trust doctrine, plenary power, and judicial review in derogation of reserved
rights is felt most acutely when tribes employ development methods that promote Indian culture and
identity.235 When Indian “ethnodevelopment”236 threatens the regulatory jurisdiction, market power, and
237
238
legal sovereignty of the States and the U.S., federal Indian law checks its expression.

226

Two centuries after Worcester the Supreme Court “continues to permit the exercise of plenary power . . . where . . . broad
discretionary powers are vital to the solution of the ‘Indian problem.’” Williams, supra note 111, at 360.
227
L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 (1996).
228
See supra at notes_ and accompanying text (elaborating doctrines of reserved rights, plenary power, and their intersection in
federal Indian law). The legal standard for abrogation of Indian treaties remains “plain and unambiguous” Congressional intent.
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985); see also Lac du Flambeau Indians v. Stop Treaty
Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 759 F.Supp 1339 (1991) (same); U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740 (establishing that “Congress actually [has
to have] considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose[n] to
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”). Absent this showing, federal courts have read reserved rights to require
imposition of corresponding State and federal duties, including obligations to secure access rights to historic lands and waters,
insulate tribes from State licensing fees, and protect against discriminatory State regulations. See Michael C. Blumm & Brett M.
Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 407, 500 (1998) (enunciating duties of U.S. and States to protect Indian reserved rights).
229
Recent critics of Indian reserved rights have attacked the foundations of the reservation system itself, not merely as “some sort
of Rube Goldberg device for the control of Indian people” but as an inefficent, ineffective system. Some call for the dissolution
of reservations and the redistribution of reservation-based resources. See, e.g., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS 275. (John H. Moore ed., 1993) [hereinafter MOORE].
230
Indian reserved rights to fish, hunt, use water, and possess land have been frequent subjects of violent treaty abrogation
campaigns. See, e.g., Progressive Animal Welfare Society et al. v. Slater et al., No. 98-36053, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3525
(March 4, 1999) (affirming decision of District Court in refusing to grant preliminary injunction to prevent Coast Guard from
implementing rule establishing protective zone around Makah Indian tribe exercising reserved right to whale); John Enders, Ore.
Farmers Rejoice at Water’s Release, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2002, at A2 (reporting conflict between Klamath Indian religious
rights to take fish and farmers’ interest in use of dammed water in Oregon). For a discussion of the cultural and religious
importance of hunting and fishing rights to Indian tribes, as well as a sketch of the dimensions and intensity of the conflict over
Indian reserved rights and their intersection with and opposition to non-Indian economic interests, see Shelley D. Turner, The
Native American’s Right to Hunt and Fish: An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System, the Effect of
European Contact and the Continuing Fight to Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M. L. REV. 377 (1999).
231
Machinations within the so-called “iron triangle”—interlocking directorates of the Bureau of Reclamation, State officials, and
corporate interests—have denied Indians the beneficial use of reserved water rights. See LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 23 (1991). For a discussion of this contested Indian right, see
Taiawagi Helton, Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L. J. 979 (1998).
232
Analysis of access to resources on lands ceded by treaty tracks closely with reserved rights in land not ceded, with explicit
congressional intent the standard for abrogation. See Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753
(termination of usufructuary rights requires express statutory language and cannot be inferred).
233
See Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 515 (holding Indian usufructuary rights are “temporary and precarious” privileges that do not
survive admission of the State in which those rights are exercised into the Union).
234
Recent caselaw suggests that, while the standard for abrogation remains clear expression of congressional intent, legal
th
protection of Indian reserved rights is backsliding. See, e.g., Western Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Moline, 951 F.2d 200 (9 Cir.
1991) (upholding ICC finding that Shoshone reserved rights to hunt and fish were extinguished “by gradual encroachment by
th
whites”); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 994 (10 Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 (1996) (treaty rights
reserved “during the pleasure of the President” abrogated by equal-footing admission of Wyoming into the Union; Mille Lacs,
562 U.S. at 224-25 (J. Thomas, dissenting) (finding Indian reserved rights, where they can be construed to operate in derogation
of State sovereignty, are mere privileges subject to State regulation) (citation omitted).
235
Indian culture is a meta-value informing and legitimizing Indian politico-economic organization. TERRY L. ANDERSON
(ed.), PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 246 (1992). Preferences, institutions, and strategies are determined
by Indian culture, and observers identify BIA failure to craft development plans that enjoy a cultural “goodness of fit” as a
primary determinant of relative Indian deprivation. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 56, at 19 (positing cultural fit as condition
precedent to sustainable Indian development).
24

3. Forced Assimilation
Early U.S.-Indian treaties did not contemplate incorporation of Indians as U.S. citizens, and later
treaties incorporated only those individuals who had been “detribalized.”239 Against the force of a clear
general preference for a primary affiliation with tribal institutions,240 federal Indian policy has subsumed
individual Indians within the body politic, thereby facilitating the seizure of tribal lands and resources, the
elimination of contending governmental entities,241 and the eradication of a critical mass of practitioners
of alien cultures “stand(ing) in the way of progress.”242 The first such assimilative measure, Allotment,
divested many Indians of land and created great physical and social distance between them and their
tribes. The imposition of U.S. citizenship in 1924243 added legal momentum by foisting an awkward dual
allegiance upon Indians and pressuring them to transfer loyalties from their tribes to the U.S.244
a. Termination
236

See Mireya Maritza Pena Guzman, The Emerging System of International Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 251, 257 (1996) (defining “ethnodevelopment” as autonomous economic activity comporting with religious
and cultural requirements of equitability and intergenerational responsibility, and citing international “soft law” in support). For
Indians, hunting, fishing, and other ethnodevelopmental enterprises are religious duties that reinforce stewardship.
237
Indian gaming, though but one of the economic modalities that generate competition and conflict with States, is perhaps the
most visible. See Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 711, 736 (1996) (noting that States may soon enter the gaming market as competitors).
238
Profound polarization of belief systems and underdeveloped historical understandings conspire to deprive Indian tribes of
ethnodevelopmental rights, as a recent case illustrates. In 1855 the Makah reserved the right to hunt gray whales as they had for
millennia in traditional waters off Washington State. See Treaty between the United States of America and the Makah Tribe of
Indians, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939, 940. By the 1920s, non-Indian whalers had hunted gray whales to near-extinction, and the
Makah, motivated by a deep religious connection to gray whales, voluntarily ceased whaling. When by 1993 gray whales were
no longer endangered as a matter of U.S. law, the Makah asked the U.S. to espouse their petition for an aboriginal subsistence
exception to the international legal prohibition on whaling. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2,
1946, Arg.-Austl.-Braz.-Can.-Chile, etc., 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 62 Stat. 1716 (1953) (prohibiting whaling listed species without a
th
permit). Although the U.S. assisted the Makah in receiving a quota to whale under international law, the 9 Circuit interpreted
procedural provisions of environmental legislation narrowly so as to divest their substantive right to whale. See Metcalf v. Daley,
214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting U.S. executive action in support of Makah petition prior to completion of
Environmental Assessment as violating timing requirements of NEPA); William Bradford,“Save the Whales” v. Save the Makah:
Finding Negotiated Solutions to Ethnodevelopmental Disputes, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 155 (2000) (discussing case).
239
See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of
Forcing Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 107, 108-09 (1999) (discussing mechanisms
whereby Indians became citizens prior to 1924, including acceptance of individual share of communal landholdings and
assumption of “characteristics and mannerisms of a civilized person”).
240
See Rosen, supra note 40, at 245 (“Many [Indian tribes] want true self-governance to the exclusion of any other polity; many
do not want citizenship imposed upon them[.]”).
241
See Herz, supra note 144, at 691 (stating indigenous groups “undermine political and social stability by creating an orthodoxy
in competition with . . . the dominant culture” that “undermines the state’s claim to territorial sovereignty as well as its status as
the representative of all citizens[.]”). The solution to the problem of competing governance regimes is, for many states, the
assimilation of indigenous peoples, whether through force or cooptation. Id.
242
LOPAC & CLOW, supra note 130, at 20; see also DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36 (“American Indian[s] . . . have
experienced cultural imperialism not merely as an unspoken [social] phenomenon . . . but through government policies that
promoted their forcible assimilation[.]”); RUSSEL L. BARSH & JAMES Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES
AND POLITICAL LIBERTY viii (1980) (chronicling “a history of attempts to subvert [tribal] consciousness and replace it with
naked, alienated individualism[.]”) As with many other dimensions of U.S. Indian policy, many assimilationists attach benign
purposes to their proposals; “friends of the Indian” suggest assimilation is promotive of racial and ethnic harmony. See, e.g.,
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY (1992); J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47
STAN. L. REV. 993 (1995). This “benign assimilationism” flies in the face of culturally deprived, economically dependent
urban Indians, who, as a consequence of their inability to participate meaningfully in either traditional tribal or majoritarian
societies, suffer physical and mental ills. See WELLS, supra note 106, at 61 (correlating increased incidence of Indian social
pathology with assimilationist policies that divided kinship groups and divested Indians of culture); LAURENCE FRENCH, THE
WINDS OF INJUSTICE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT xvi (1994) (discussing challenges facing
assimilated urban Indians).
243
See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as carried forward at 8 U.S.C. §1401(b) (1988) (“Indian Citizenship
Act”) (granting citizenship to all non-citizen Indians “born within the territorial limits of the United States”)
244
See Joseph William Singer, The Stranger Who Resides With You: Ironies of Asian-American and American Indian Legal
History, 40 B.C. L. REV. 171, 174 (1998); see also Atkinson, supra note 45, at 263 (noting that after passage of the Indian
Citizenship Act it became extremely difficult as a matter of law for an Indian to claim dual citizenship).
25

Although assimilationist pressure abated during the Depression and World War II, with the onset
of the Cold War and mounting fears of enemies within the preservation of distinct political communities
within U.S. boundaries became too offensive for many non-Indians to tolerate.245 House Concurrent
Resolution 108 [“Termination”] exercised plenary power to “make the Indians . . . subject to the same
laws and . . . responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the [U.S., and] to end their status as
wards[.]246 Termination, under the direction of the former head of the War Relocation Authority,247 ended
the U.S. trust relationship with over 100 selected tribes,248 curtailing federal benefits and services,
dissolving tribal governments, and distributing former tribal lands and assets on a per capita basis.249 By
legislatively disappearing tribes,250 Termination stripped Indian people not only of primary sources of
political allegiance and economic sustenance but of sacred sites and other fonts of cultural renewal.
Assimilationist pressure mounted, and in 1954 Public Law 280,251 by according States extensive
jurisdiction over Indian tribes and individuals, granted non-Indian institutions of social control the legal
authority to adjudge and condemn Indian domestic relations and employment practices.252
b. Relocation
253
Predicated upon the misapprehension that the emerging “Indian problem” was rooted in

segregation and parochialism rather than a cascade of assimilative legislation, Public Law 959
[“Relocation”]254 directed federal agencies to create “Indians who were Indian in appearance but not in
culture”255 and sap remaining tribal political strength. At a time when reservations were increasingly
unable to provide material necessities,256 Relocation, by portraying “contented Indian[s] working at good

245

DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36, at 111.
rd
st
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83 Cong., 1 Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (Aug. 1, 1953) (enacted), repealed by 25 U.S.C. §2502 (1988)
(authorizing administrative and Congressional action to terminate tribes in California, Florida, New York, and Texas).
247
Perhaps uncoincidentally, the BIA Commissioner responsible for executing Termination, Dillon Meyer, served as Head of the
War Relocation Authority, the agency in charge of Japanese-American internment. FRENCH, supra note 242, at 60.
248
Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 140 (1977)
(identifying 109 terminated tribes). Although the process whereby tribes were selected for Termination is beyond the scope of
this Article, scholars note correlations with wealth and political activism. CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 42, at 119.
249
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132.
250
Termination has been partially reversed: thirty-one previously terminated tribes have been reinstated to federally-recognized
status. See, e.g., Oklahoma Indians Restoration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 950281, 92 Stat. 246 (1977) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 861861(c) (1977). However, many tribes remain terminated or unreconstituted and therefore unrecognized, a status which precludes
availment of the protective aspects and benefits programs of the trust doctrine.
251
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. 280, No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A § 1161-1162 (1994),
25 U.S.C.A. §§1321-22, & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
252
Subsequent to Public Law 280, State Departments of Health seized Indian children and placed then with non-Indian parents at
rates disproportionate to other races, relying on the culturally-bound theory that traditional Indian parenting, reliant on extended
kinship groups for monitoring and nurturing children, was tantamount to neglect. BURNETTE & KOSTER, supra note 178, at
133; see also Pritchard, supra note 154, at 259 (noting long history of forced division of Indian families). Although legislation
has heightened protection of Indian familial and tribal rights, the right of Indian children to be raised as Indians by Indian parents
remains a focal point in the struggle to remedy the assimilative effects of Public Law 280. See Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (1978)). Similarly, adult urban Indians experience
considerably more contact with criminal justice systems than they did prior to the passage of Public Law 280. See JOSEPHY,
supra note 203, at 75 (linking Indian maladjustment with federal Indian law and policy and stressing that “for the sake of our
psychic stability as well as our physical well-being we must be free men and exercise free choices”); see also ERIC K.
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 9495 (2000) (linking cultural imperialism of federal Indian policies such as Public Law 280 with psychological trauma and social
dysfunction, including substance abuse, incarceration, and domestic violence).
253
th
The “Indian problem” from the mid-20 century dominant perspective consisted of (1) continuing tribal sovereignty on land
within U.S. borders and (2) social maladjustment experienced by Indians forced from reservations by Allotment and Termination.
254
Act of Aug. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-959, 70 Stat. 986 (1956) (“Relocation”).
255
PEVAR, supra note 80, at 32.
256
See JOSEPHY, supra note 203, at 72 (noting that by the 1950s many reservations could not support their populations).
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257

jobs and sitting beside televisions and refrigerators [in Northern cities,]” induced an exodus to magnet
urban areas. A generation of the Indian best and brightest258 were dumped into substandard housing259 and
menial employment260 and subsumed in the American melting pot.261
By 1970 reservation populations had dwindled so far that final solution to the Indian problem
appeared at hand, and yet the “stubborn [Indian] refusal to . . . become simply another American
citizen”262 has sustained tribalism against a malign tide of assimilationism unto the present day.263
Although Indian individuals currently possess both tribal and federal citizenship, federal Indian law treats
tribes as subordinate governments,264 and thus meaningful “dual citizenship”—predicated upon the
assumption that tribal and federal governments exercise separate, if overlapping, spheres of authority in
good faith—is a legal fiction. For many Indians, this forced “split identification” was a genocidal act
destructive of tribal political identities,265 and few believe that tribal and national political participation
can coexist when Indian self-determination is construed to threaten U.S. territorial integrity.266
D. Summary: The Claim for Indian Redress
267

“We have borne everything patiently for this long time.”

The past two centuries of U.S. relations with Indians have been replete with “tremendous
violence, treachery, and . . . pure evil.”268 Millions of Indians were murdered to depopulate and seize
Indian land while eliminating rival polities within the colonial state constructed thereon. Presently, a set
of institutionalized legal impediments269 runs through the domestic order, trammeling what remains of the
270

Indian right to legal, political, and economic self-determination.

Caught in a web woven from a malign

history and a skein of ongoing legal disabilities, Indians have been rendered the most materially
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Russell L. Barsh, Are We Stuck in the Slime of History? 15 AM. INDIAN Q. 187, 191 (1991).
BURT, supra note 199, at 78 (identifying Indians with leadership skills as targets of Relocation). More than 35,000 were
relocated after signing an agreement that they would never reestablish residence on reservations. Atkinson, supra note 55, at 409.
259
See BURNETTE & KOSTER, supra note 178, at 182 (noting institutionalized housing discrimination against urban Indians).
260
FRENCH, supra note 242, at 66.
261
Off-reservation Indians who do not enroll as tribal members are not only ineligible for reservation-based federal services: they
are, for reasons of physical and social distance, unable to participate in the languages, lifestyles, and communities constituting
Indian identity. WELLS, supra note 106, at 5-6.
262
J. C. Wise, The Red Man in the New World Drama 399, in Deloria, ed., 1971 (“While the years have shown . . . assimilation of
other groups, only the red man has stood firm, resisting all efforts to merge him with the groups that surround him[.]”)
263
Relocation continues as federal policy, albeit outside the legislative orbit of Public Law 959. See CADWALADER &
DELORIA, supra note 42, at (describing exercises of plenary power to relocate Indians within reservations to facilitate mineral
extraction and corporate development).
264
See Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light
of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 632 (1994) (elaborating theory of “compact federalist”
incorporation of Indian nations within the federal system in a constitutional relationship “roughly approximating [that] between
the [S]tates and the federal government[.]”).
265
See Porter, supra note 239, at 166-68 (arguing that forcing Indians to accept U.S. citizenship, along with ongoing practices of
forced relocation and assimilation, qualify as genocidal acts within the meaning of the Genocide Convention).
266
VINE DELORIA, JR., ED., AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 99 (1985).
267
John Brant, Mohawk, available at http://www.historytelevision.ca/chiefs/htmlen/mohawk/news.
268
Tsosie, supra note 68, at 1661-62.
269
Taken together, the trust doctrine, plenary power, and judicial subversion of reserved rights constitute a matrix of legal
disability that refers Indian rights to property, culture, and self-government to interpretation and suppression by an often hostile
non-Indian majority. Further, although it incorporates principles that are not “relentlessly hurtful” and provides internal
resources with which to mount criticisms against it, federal Indian law is a contradictory maze, and the U.S. does not live up to its
aspirations as to the best interpretation thereof.
270
Self-determination raises the question of precisely who has the right to decide the political, legal, cultural, and economic norms
and rules that govern Indian tribes. See JOSEPHY, supra note 203, at 35. By exercising their rights to self-determine, Indian
tribes challenge States, transnational corporations, NGOs, and others who impose norms and rules. See MICHAEL OMNI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 45-50 (1994).
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deprived, politically and economically dependent, and legally exposed group in the nation. It is perhaps
impossible to overstate the magnitude of the human injustice perpetrated against Indian people: indeed,
the severity and duration of the harms endured by the original inhabitants of the U.S. may well exceed
those suffered by all other groups domestic and international.272 The next Part will present several
theories of justice in regard to the Indian claim.
II.

The Indian Claim for Redress: Existing Theories of Justice
273

“Hardly any two . . . agree on what should be done.”

Extant theories of justice with respect to the Indian claim cluster around three distinct approaches:
supersession, compensation, and restoration.274
A. Justice as Supersession
While the historical record of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide inflicted upon Indians might be
understood as establishing a factual predicate presumptively obligating the U.S. and its political
subdivisions to remedy these gross historical injustices, some theorists, foremost among them proponents
of the Justice as Supersession [“JAS”] theory, reach a very different conclusion. JAS theorists reject as
foolishly naïve a “natural way of reasoning” that would require that lands illicitly taken by colonial
invaders and passed on to their descendants through the generations be nonetheless returned.275 Although
JAS theory recognizes that the historical record has an important place in the development and
application of a theory of justice with respect to Indian claims, for JAS theorists the historical injustices
suffered by Indian claimants must be weighed against the current injustice that would be inflicted upon
innocent owners now in possession of erstwhile Indian lands were those lands stripped away and restored
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Indian reservations remain among the most impoverished areas in the U.S. Whereas between 8-14% of the U.S. population
toils below the poverty line, the figure is 40% of all Indians, with some tribes faring worse. See 138 Cong. Rec. S3426 (daily ed.
Mar. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. John McCain (Rep.-Ariz.); Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and
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to Indian ownership.

To sanction a moral understanding that demands restoration of Indian lands would

have practical effects, foremost among them the dispossession and impoverishment of non-Indian
landowners, an outcome with which JAS theorists are not prepared to abide.277 To avoid this, JAS
theorists urge us to reconceive of the historical injustices suffered by Indian tribes and individuals as a
278
“dead history” and to accept that Indian claims for redress have been superseded by demographic and

ecological transformations279—in other words, while injustice may have been inflicted in centuries past,
injustice is perishable, and the accreting rights of non-Indians in Indian land have incrementally
extinguished, or at least rendered morally irrelevant, any present claims for its restoration.280
Although they recognize that “the view that a violated entitlement can ‘fade’ with time may seem
unfair[,]”281 JAS theorists defend their supersession thesis by way of two arguments. First, they claim that
it is impossible to know with any degree of certainty whether Indian claimants would in fact have
remained seized of their land entitlements (and thus transmitted their landholdings to their descendants) in
the absence of non-Indian expropriation or whether they might have voluntarily parted with them for
good consideration.282 In other words, because Indians might in theory have been divested of title by
some other process, the moral relevance of forcible and fraudulent expropriation to the contemporary
question of whether to afford redress for the seizure of Indian land is to be discounted in proportion to the
perceived probability that Indians would have sold or otherwise alienated their entitlements.
Second, JAS theorists posit that the true test of the legitimacy of an entitlement stems not
principally from the inherent justice of the process whereby it was acquired283 but rather from its
indispensability to the subsistence of the party claiming it. Thus, if a disentitled claimant generations
removed from ownership cannot demonstrate that he has “organized his life around the use of [the
property interest],” rather than simply “organize[d] [his] life around the campaign for its restoration[,]”
his claim based upon original entitlement is depreciated and even forfeit to a party currently in possession
for whom the property is presumptively indispensable as his current residence, business, or farm.284 In
practice, because Indians have managed to stave off extinction and starvation despite the divestiture of
nearly 98% of their pre-contact land mass, and because that land mass has been thickly settled over the
276
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course of several generations by non-Indians who would “starve” or be “hurt or degraded” if they were
evicted, it is plain to JAS theorists that the lands in question are indispensable only to their present
possessors. Although JAS theorists concede that the mechanisms whereby Indian claimants were
separated from their entitlements were unjust, they maintain that the remediation of past injustices cannot
be accomplished without inflicting a present and even greater injustice upon the non-Indian majority, and
thus JAS theory rejects proposals to restore land to Indian ownership as practically irrelevant and
fundamentally unfair in light of fundamental changes in circumstances.286 In short, property rights are
“thinner and much more flexible, or variable with circumstances,” than Indian claimants understand them
to be, and they must “bend to the needs and interests of human beings.”287
288

JAS proponents defend what they further concede is very much a prospective theory by
asserting that only a deliberate discounting of the past can possibly ensure that resources are allocated in a
manner that is “fair to all of [the world’s] existing inhabitants.” Because they now constitute the
overwhelming majority, non-Indians, rather than the Indians they have displaced, reduced, and greatly
outnumbered, are the primary reference point for assessing the requirements of justice, and for JAS
theorists even had they not come by their current entitlements through fraud and force they would
presently be entitled to a share of Indian lands proportionate to their numbers by the simple virtue of their
existence here in North America coupled with their legitimate need.289 Thus, although they accept that
symbolic recognition and remembrance of historical injustices inflicted upon Indians may often be
morally appropriate and that Indians are entitled to a more equitable distribution of the panoply of
resources generally available within society,290 JAS theorists, protective of the interests of present
possessors whom they hold blameless or at least legally and morally unaccountable for historical
injustices,291 categorically reject any and all proposals that would go so far as to “actually . . . rectify past
wrongs” by either re-transferring lands to Indian claimants or by paying their full, as distinct from
symbolic, value in compensation.292 Compensation is thus, at best, an act of grace unrelated to any moral
285
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or legal obligation; at worst it is an underserved handout to the losers of a long-ago struggle for the
continental landmass that, if employed injudiciously, may threaten non-Indians with personal financial
loss and justifiably provoke resentment.
With regard to Indian claims for ethnocide and denial of the right to self-determine, JAS theorists,
although they accept in theory that individuals have the basic human need to belong to groups “united by
some common links—especially language, collective memories, continuous life upon the same soil[,]”
and perhaps “race, blood, religion, [and] a sense of common mission,”293 reject Indian tribes as mere
“partisans of small-scale community” lacking in any entitlement to “special support or assistance or to
extraordinary provision or forbearance”294 from the U.S. Rather than encourage an “artificial”
commitment to tribalism, JAS theorists would require Indian cultures to “wither away[,]” to “amalgamate
with other cultures” and to “adapt themselves to geographical and demographic necessity.”295 Further,
rather than accept that Indian culture and the right to self-govern as distinct tribal communities are worthy
of preservation and that injuries to either give rise to obligations to afford redress, JAS theory demands
that Indians submit to a “mongrelization of [their] identity” and assimilate into the body politic in service
to a cosmopolitan vision that broadens the scope of individual life possibilities and serves as a more
“authentic response to the world in which we live[.]”296 Although JAS theory does not go so far as to
immunize ethnocide and forcible denial of the right of Indian tribes to self-determine, it suggests strongly
that the historical processes responsible for the loss of culture and the right to self-govern as discrete and
insular communities are at worst of trivial moral or legal consequence and at best are even promotive of
the individual rights and life possibilities of individual Indians.
In sum, JAS theory holds that while the U.S. may be obligated to negotiate toward a settlement
that would offer some symbolic redress for expropriation, genocide, and ethnocide,297 any retrospective
proposal to restore lands, pay market value for expropriations, or transform existing legal regimes to lend
genuine political and material support to Indian self-determination would inflict greater injustices upon
living non-Indians than the historical injustices visited upon long-dead Indians it would be intended to
redress while simultaneously interfering with the opportunities of living individual Indians to partake of
the superior virtues of Western liberal cosmopolitanism.
B.

Justice as Compensation
For Justice as Compensation [“JAC”] theorists, a much more parsimonious approach to justice

requires, quite simply, that where land has been acquired unjustly through fraud or force it must,
regardless of whether or not it has been subsequently transferred lawfully, either be restored to its rightful
owner or full compensation must be paid.298 Where sacred lands are concerned, the obligation to restore is
at a zenith, and where restoration is pragmatically imprudent or otherwise not consistent with the
293
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requirements of justice inasmuch as it would require the dispossession of non-Indians, Indians must be
grated rights-of-way to such sites.300 By accepting the duty to restore or compensate and thereby settling
the normative question, JAC theorists are free to direct their energies to prudential issues such as
membership in the remedial class, the form compensation is to assume, and the identities of the parties
from whom restoration or compensation must issue. JAC theorists accept the argument that the historic
deprivation of Indian lands is causally related to the denial of the Indian right to self-determine and to the
material deprivation currently experienced by Indian tribes and individuals, and consequently view
compensation for expropriation as “just an example of ordinary corrective justice” that, coupled with
“some form of group-based political autonomy”—whether exemptions from general tax legislation or
other group-specific entitlements—befits the redress of Indian claims.301
Nevertheless, many who would otherwise recognize the duty to afford redress to Indians for land
expropriation point to relevant treaties and statutes,302 the Indian Claims Commission [“ICC”],303 and a
host of federal Indian benefits programs legislated and appropriated under the trust responsibility304 as
evidence that compensation has already been paid and claims have been (at least partially) settled.305 Even
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those JAC theorists who would accept that further measures of compensatory relief are still due Indian
claimants insist that amounts be negotiated through the political process rather than determined in
accordance with some rational, objective framework.306 Some are likely to insist that a “commitment
device” be engineered that would definitively and finally resolve Indian land claims and prevent their
307

subsequent reopening even if justice should be determined to so require at some later date.

Moreover, JAC theory is largely silent as to the remediation of the elements of ethnocide and
denial of the right to self-determine. Whether as the result of a presumption that cash cannot compensate
these losses, an limited remedial reach, a philosophical commitment to assimilation akin to that held by
JAS theorists, or an ignorance of these equally, if not more, compelling elements of the Indian claim, JAC
theory, a mode of redress morphologically identical to reparations, is ultimately a narrowly-tailored
approach to justice.
C. Justice as Restoration
Justice as Restoration [“JAR”] aims at a more holistic approach to the remediation of historic
injustices. For proponents of JAR, in-kind compensation, even if theoretically equivalent in value to that
which was taken, is insufficient to rectify the original injustice occasioned by its expropriation;
restoration of the illicitly appropriated property itself is essential to “set unjust situations right.” 308 Only
by restoring land can the ongoing injustice of the original expropriation be terminated.309 Moreover, and,
from a legal perspective, quite importantly, JAR theorists would reverse the presumption inherent in the
arguments propounded by JAS, and to a lesser extent JAC, theorists, that non-Indian occupants of what
was once Indian land are to be regarded as secure in their right to possession on the ground that they have
acquired moral rights by accretion through the passage of time that are now immune from attack. On the
contrary, JAR theory rejects the argument that justice is perishable and maintains instead that the burden
falls upon the U.S. to justify the entitlements of the present inhabitants of land seized from Indian tribes:
Indian land is thus presumptively Indian land irrespective of the length of time it has been out of Indian
possession.310 Accordingly, when JAR theorists “have good reason to think that an appropriate reparation
should take the form of returning some of the land that was unjustly taken, then the entitlements of
present owners should give way.”311
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Even more significantly, JAR does not limit its remedial scope to the issue of land rights: rather,
the remedial focus of JAR extends to those “injustices that may in fact loom larger in the minds of the
victims or their descendants—murder, torture, enslavement, discrimination and degradation.”

312

Because

the restoration of land rights alone is inadequate to the project of restoring moral parity between the
Indians and the U.S., JAR theorists insist that a full moral, as distinct from a merely legal, accounting and
settlement of claims necessitates that the U.S. first publicly acknowledge and apologize for specific past
acts and then accept some form of social punishment (even if sanctions are limited to critical moral
judgments).313 Many particularized JAR theories rely on truth and reconciliation commissions
[“TRCs”],314 tribunals that investigate the gross human injustices of the previous regime and construct and
publicize an unflinching historical record,315 as integral to this process.316
Furthermore, JAR contends that theories which purport to remedy the results of a genocidal and
317
ethnocidal history solely “through the language of missing property” fail to reach and redress moral and

other non-material harms while missing transformative opportunities whereby to reconcile victims and
wrongdoers and lay the foundation for a peaceful and cooperative joint future. Accordingly, in
conjunction with land restoration and apologies, JAR theorists call for rehabilitative measures designed to
heal the injured psyches of individuals and to nurture the capacity of victim groups to engage in
meaningful self-determination.318 Some JAR theorists cast promotion of self-determination as a necessary
condition precedent to the moral relegitimization of the nation.319 Still, although some JAR theorists
advocate expansive proposals that would reinvest a significant degree of land and political autonomy in
beneficiary groups and liberate them from the control of the majoritarian legal and political system either
through limited legislative dispensations or through some process of formal secession,320 and while in the
context of Indian claims they are more inclined to consider the merits of expansive self-determination
proposals than they are in regard to other groups lacking in the ties of culture , religion, and political
312
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association that constitute Indian tribes, most propose far more limited self-determination agendae that
do not would provide beneficiary groups a package of grants, subsidies, and tax incentives.322
D. Analysis
At its core, JAS theory is a not terribly subtle justification for conquest and forced assimilation.
While JAS theorists may consider this characterization as reductionist and reflexively dismissive of the
obvious merits of their theory—namely, its pragmatic and utilitarian approach to preserving the interests
of the non-Indian majority—stripped of its academic veneer JAS theory is little more than the medieval
dogmas once enunciated by conquistadors as justification for their adventures in the Americas. The
indispensability thesis central to JAS theory—that formerly Indian lands are indispensable not to Indian
survival, as Indians have somehow survived without them, but to non-Indians currently in possession,
who would suffer impoverishment and uprooting were they stripped of title—actually marshals the fact
that Indians have managed to survive expropriation, genocide, and ethnocide as evidence against their
claim: had Indians been extinguished as the consequence of the expropriation of their lands, then and only
then would JAS theorists concede that Indian lands were indispensable to Indians, and even then there
would be no claimants left for the benefit of whom justice might be done. In other words, Indians have
proven that they can do without Indian lands, but non-Indians either cannot or should not have to make
the same showing. The only explanations JAS theory offers to support its historical agnosticism and
differential treatment are two: (1) that was then, and this is now; and (2) the fundamental precept of
Western liberal jurisprudence, that like cases are decided alike, does not apply to Indian claims.
Moreover, JAS theory deliberately ignores millennia of Indian stewardship of lands and
resources, consistent with their religious and social obligations to preserve entitlements for the benefit of
future generations, in presuming that Indians might have parted with their land by some other process
than force or fraud and that as a result it is impossible to link Indian disenfranchisement with historical
injustice for which non-Indians must answer. Although it is at least theoretically possible that Indian
lands might have at some point in history passed from Indian proprietorship and become Indianrein323, as
the history and philosophy of the relationship of Indians to their land demonstrates there is far more
reason to build the presumption that, absent non-Indian deceit and violence, Indians would remain
possessed of their lands as caretakers for future generations into a theory of justice, and a much more
compelling argument that those who dispossessed Indians of title ought to be obligated to justify their
actions. It is difficult to ascribe the refusal to recognize this nexus to historical myopia rather than to a
deliberate agenda that preserves the status quo and privileges majoritarian claims to an invaluable
resource upon which nearly all other contemporary entitlements hinge.
In other words, rather than present a theory of justice, JAS theorists elaborate a rationalization for
genocide and ethnocide that suggests to Indians that “our culture is superior to yours, that’s why we won
the war, and to the victors go the spoils, so either content yourselves with scraps we throw you savages or
321
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better yet shed your anachronistic Indianness and embrace our modern civilization, but either way stop
bringing up the past—it poisons our national body politic and scares us nice non-Indian people.” Simply
put, JAS, almost absolutely indifferent to the present effects of past injustice, categorically rejects any
moral or legal obligations flowing from conquest and genocide In the face of the claim that the theft of
Indian land and the murder of Indian people are neutral facts, Indians might conclude that the only path to
justice is down the very same road whereby their rights to land and self-determination were taken.324
JAC theory, in contrast, rejects two premises put forth by JAS theorists, namely that history is
dead insofar as the obligation to render justice for past wrongs is concerned and that the passage of time
can and has rendered good a thief’s title.325 As such, it deserves to be taken seriously as a theory of
justice. Compensating Indians would alleviate grinding poverty and enhance the material conditions of
their existence, and, if accompanied by expressions of regret and remorse, might demonstrate to future
generations the continuing vitality of moral duties to refrain from genocide, land theft, and ethnocide.326
The infusion of significant sums into tribal institutions might even reduce dependence upon the U.S. by
creating the financial preconditions for genuine self-determination and enabling tribes to pursue programs
of land restoration and economic development.
However, JAC theory is morphologically similar to reparations, and thus far too quick to assume
that cash and Indian land are commensurable327 and far too susceptible to counter-claims that, even if
money may in respect to some tribal claims be a roughly adequate remedy, sufficient compensation either
has already been paid or will be paid to discharge the obligation to remedy all the past injustices visited
upon all Indians. Simply put, money can play at best an indirect part in the satisfaction of the harms of
which Indians complain: although a diversity of opinion exists within Indian Country, most Indians desire
above all not to be made whole financially but rather to exercise their rights to self-determine and to
express their unique cultures and religions upon their sacred ancestral lands.328 Only land restoration and
legal transformations that permit the (re)development of separate political identities can actualize these
fundamental rights and relieve the economic deprivation and emotional pain Indians bear
intergenerationally. While cash would improve Indians’ bargaining position in regard to reclamation of
lands and reduce their sociopolitical dependency upon the U.S., there is no amount of money that can
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compel unwilling sellers, public or private, to reconvey formerly Indian lands, and no dollar figure for
which tribes would be willing to trade their right to self-govern. Cash, however beneficial to its
recipients, cannot restore to Indians the capacity to self-determine on their aboriginal landmass.
Furthermore, JAC theorists who suggest that Indian claims have been retired misunderstand the
nature of the federal trust responsibility. Payments under the trust doctrine are categorically not
compensation for injuries but rather consideration for the voluntary cession of lands and other resources.
Moreover, compensation paid by Congress through the ICC or other mechanisms represents at best a tiny
fraction of the value consequences of expropriation, genocide, and ethnocide.329
Moreover, even if Indian tribes could somehow be persuaded to surrender their claims to lands
and rights for cash, the fair value would be so great as to threaten the national fisc and spark a racialized
political firestorm.330 Indian tribes presently control only 52 million acres, or 2.6%, of the U.S.
continental landmass. The ICC, charged with assessing relative U.S. responsibility for the expropriation
of Indian lands, estimated that 35% of the two billion acres that comprise the U.S.—a total of 750 million
acres—is legally Indian land.331 Assuming, arguendo, that the median value of an acre of land in the U.S.
332
is approximately $1000, the fair market cost to compensate Indians for its expropriation would exceed

$750 billion, an amount that, if paid, would have macroeconomic consequences.333 Even assuming that
nothing close to fair market value would be paid as compensation for takings of Indian land,334 and even if
off-sets were applied to reduce the award by the amounts paid under the trust doctrine or by the ICC, the
enormity of any proposal that would offer only “payment on the cheap” would still be so great as to
almost certainly preclude its payment. If one factors into the compensatory scheme additional monies for
the wrongful deaths of at least five million ancestors of present Indian claimants335 at a paltry rate of
$100,000 for each decedent—and JAC theory is further to be faulted for failing to extend its remedial
reach to genocide—the total cost to taxpayers would exceed a trillion dollars. Those ignorant of the
historical predicate behind the demand for justice might mistakenly equate compensation with revenge;336
others, merely self-interested, may be unwilling to effect such a radical redistribution of wealth. Either
way, many Indians, concerned that application of JAC theory is likely to thrust Indians and non-Indians
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into contending camps and lock them in political and legal combat in which anything goes in the fight
over the wealth and power of the state,337 join with non-Indians in opposing this approach to justice.
Finally, JAC theory completely fails to account for the most important variable in the remedial
equation: law. Under the doctrine of plenary power, Congress has nearly absolute and unreviewable
dominion over Indian tribes, and in concert with the political question doctrine plenary power precludes
judicial undoing of fraudulent treaties, proscribes the review of takings, insulates violations of treaty
provisions, and withdraws Indian property, culture, religion from the protection of the Constitution.338
Moreover, that which Congress can give, Congress can take away. Any settlement of Indian claims must
therefore be understood as dependent not upon the honor of the U.S. but rather upon the inconstant will of
a majority of its legislative branch. Under the current legal regime, should a future Congress elect to
reclaim monies paid as compensation, take property purchased with such monies without paying
compensation, or even terminate each and every Indian tribe, dissolve each and every reservation, and
criminalize each and every aspect of Indian culture, nothing—nothing—save for any resulting moral
outrage at such a naked assertion of power will stand in its way. In other words, federal Indian law—
already barren terrain for the expression of Indian claims—is structurally incapable of according Indians
the sort of commitment device that might ensure the finality of any compensation agreement, even in the
decidedly unlikely event that an agreement could ever be fashioned that would reach most, or even some,
of the elements in the Indian claim. Power is still the only currency fully negotiable in intercourse
between the U.S. and Indians.
Of the three theory clusters, only JAR embraces restoration as the method of redress appropriate
in respect to Indian land claims, and only JAR is theoretically amenable to consideration of the nonmaterial injuries that occupy a central place in the Indian claim for redress. Furthermore, only JAR would
hold the U.S. accountable under moral, as opposed to strictly legal, principles, and only JAR would even
attempt to induce the U.S. to acknowledge and repudiate past acts of egregious injustice, as opposed to
simply internalizing their costs. Quite distinct from JAS and JAC theories, JAR recognizes that justice is
not merely a settlement of historical accounts but an opportunity to reconcile with Indians and to
relegitimize the nation in its relations at home and abroad, and of the various theoretical offerings only
JAR hints at an institutional framework wherein to attempt this.339 Finally, JAR is, if not positively
encouraging, at least not as hostile as are the other theoretical clusters to the notion that selfdetermination, in whatever form it comes to assume, is the legitimate objective of Indians in their
relations with the U.S., and that the U.S. has an obligation to assist them in this endeavor.
Still, while JAR is the most normatively attractive of the three theoretical clusters, JAR theory is
not the final stop on the theoretical journey to justice for Indians. JAR theory is susceptible to criticism
on several grounds. As compelling as the argument that non-Indian land owners are obligated to vacate
337
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their entitlements in favor of the descendants of their Indian predecessors-in-title may be, principles of
equity, as JAS theory is quick to assert, should proscribe the wholescale evacuation of millions of acres of
land and the forced relocation of innocent and newly-homeless non-Indians to places uncertain. Even if
equity alone is not sufficient to counsel prudence, the prospect that non-Indians threatened in the security
of their property interests might organize to induce political action resulting in further abridgement of
Indian resources and rights340 must be accounted for in any theory of Indian justice. If the only remedy for
a past injustice is a present injustice, a perpetual cycle of bloody conflict over land is inevitable.341
However, the most radical of JAR theorists are practically oblivious to the broad externalities the
restorative element of their philosophy might spawn: despite warnings that it is now much too late to
“give back Manhattan,”342 some insist that nothing short of the dissolution of the U.S. will suffice if we
343

are to “tak[e] seriously morality and justice.”

If politics is the art of the possible,344 a theory that insists

on the dismemberment of the modern-day U.S. or other forms of “radical social surgery” 345is too fantastic
to be given serious consideration as a political proposal.
Furthermore, if JAR may conceivably go too far in pressing for land restoration, like JAC theory
it does not go far enough toward facilitating Indian self-determination because it does not recognize, let
alone engage, federal Indian law as the primary variable preventing the balancing of the moral equation.
Compensation and apologies, gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, do not contribute
directly to the reinvestiture of sovereignty in Indian tribes. Only a comprehensive program of legal
reform that dispenses with doctrines and precedents perpetuating the denial of Indian rights will create the
preconditions for Indian self-determination.346 As law, more than any other social variable, has
(re)produced the subordination of Indians,347 legal reform occupies central position in a theory of Indian
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justice.

Thus, while much of JAR theory is germane, neither it nor the other theories surveyed accord

the full measure of relief or provide as accurate a diagnosis of the problem as is necessary to generate
effective solutions. Part III offers a theoretical alternative.
III.

Justice as Indigenism: An American Indian Theory of Justice

“Complaint is just toward friends who have failed in their duty; accusation is against enemies guilty of injustice.”

349

A. General Theoretical Premises
Because the past and present effects of a rapacious, bloody, and dishonorable history are factual
and moral predicates to the Indian claim for redress, the theory of Justice as Indigenism350 [“JAI”] is
committed to the premise that the development and application of a theory of Indian justice must not and
cannot be undertaken except in full cognizance of the history of U.S.-Indian relations.351 Although other
groups have claims upon the U.S., JAI rests upon the additional premise that Indians, by virtue of their
existence on American soil prior to the founding of the U.S. and the unbidden arrival of all other social
groups352 as well as the unavailability of a “homeland” abroad to which they could seek shelter from the
vicissitudes of U.S. majoritarian politics and law,353 are entitled to primacy, if not special consideration, in
the examination and evaluation of their claims for redress.354
Third, JAI ventures into terrain heretofore unmapped by insisting that a major project of legal
reforms designed to cabin plenary power, restore a meaningful measure of self-government to Indian
tribes, and make the nation safe for the peaceful coexistence of basic value-differences between peoples is
a necessary, if not sufficient, step toward the attainment of justice for Indians. Legislation and even
constitutional amendments to strengthen protection of Indian cultural and property rights, tighten judicial
canons of construction, and incorporate legal principles protective of the rights of Indians are within the
contemplation of this indigenist approach to justice.
Fourth, although it asserts the primacy of Indian rights and challenges the legitimacy of U.S.
dominion over Indians, JAI rejects the substitution of one ethnocentric perspective on justice for another:
348
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without compromising Indian rights to lands and self-determination, JAI amalgamates indigenous
traditions and values and treats reconciliation between disparate yet interdependent peoples, rather than
prescription of a formula for the distribution of social resources or the administration of punishment or
vengeance, as the appropriate teleology of a theory of justice for Indians.355 For JAI, the healing of the
American nation and the joint authorship of a peaceful and harmonious future—not simply the redress of
Indian claims—are crucial objectives.
Fifth, although it rejects the tendency to essentialize Indians as an undifferentiated population
with a uniform bloc of interests, JAI contends that a pan-Indian consensus does in fact exist as to a set of
shared objectives the attainment of which is central to the project of Indian justice and that the most
important of these are a just resolution to Indian land claims and the investment of the notion of Indian
self-determination with real meaning.356 At the same time, JAI is specifically tailored to the requirements
of justice for Indians, and generalization to the question of justice on behalf of other groups must proceed
with caution and the benefit of rigorous contextual research and analysis.
Finally, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically in light of the preceding proposition, JAI cautions
that the application of a theory of Indian justice generates moral consequences not merely in the sphere of
U.S.-Indian relations but internationally. JAI insists that if its political and legal system cannot or will not
afford justice to its original inhabitants, the U.S., no matter how presently committed to justice on behalf
of other social groups foreign and domestic, must concede that the aspirations of its founders to “establish
Justice” in a constitutional republic in which “all men are created equal” before the law and into which
they invested their “sacred Honor”357 have been sacrificed at the altar of an avaricious Indian policy.358 In
other words, JAI theory posits that the legitimacy of the U.S. and its leadership in international relations
is a function of the extent to which it affords, and is perceived to afford, justice to Indians.
B. JAI Applied: The Redress of Indian Claims for Genocide, Ethnocide, and Land Expropriation
As applied, JAI commits its practitioners to a sequential process consisting of seven distinct
stages: acknowledgment, apology, peacemaking, commemoration, compensation, land restoration, legal
reformation, and reconciliation. While each and every step marches closer toward Indian justice, failure
to press onward to each subsequent objective foreshortens remedial possibilities. Only upon reaching the
final destination—which is in reality the promise of a shared journey—can JAI be said to be complete.
1. Acknowledgement: The American Indian Reconciliation Commission
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“[W]e should not fear to cast the light of day on this murky chapter of our nation’s past[.]”
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Although most Americans disavow the malignant racism that inspired their forefathers, they
remain a remarkably presentist people, particularly with regard to the factual and moral understandings of
the events marking the “discovery,” formation, and expansion of their nation.361 This ahistoricism has dire
consequences for Indian redress, particularly where claims are asserted on unfamiliar intellectual terrain
and arise out of violations of complex historical agreements “rather than being ignited by the fire of the
moment[.]”362 Without a firm understanding of the nexus between past acts of injustice coupled with the
present effects of a legal order erected to serve the conqueror on the one hand and the Indian claim for
redress on the other, it is all too easy for existing theories of justice—particularly JAS, and to a lesser
extent JAC—to treat Indian claims as pleas for distributional justice rather than as moral arguments
demanding the internalization of the consequences of this unjust history. Displacement of a mythical
version of national genesis in favor of the truth is therefore required in order to erode the theoretical bases
of U.S. sovereignty and control over Indian people, culture, and land. Even for those non-Indians willing
and eager to make amends, “legal amnesia” interposes between Indian claims for redress and a legal and
political order that has denied justice for centuries.363
Therefore, the first step in applying JAI theory is the retelling and re-envisioning of U.S.-Indian
relations from “objective” perspectives as well as from the cultural viewpoint of the victims of that
history.364 Indian claims stories—rich sources of oral history that contextualize and humanize the Indian
experience while revealing the inadequacies of the record as it has been constructed—can be a powerful
source of liberation for all Americans. To enable national demythification, Congress should pass
legislation to establish and fund an independent TRC365 charged with (1) investigating Indian claims
afresh; (2) allowing Indian voices to enrich and debunk the sanitized national record with their oral
histories; and (3) persuading the U.S. to formally acknowledge the wrongs inflicted upon Indians over the
period since 1776 and enable the telling of a new national creation-story.
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Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS, AND
SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 346 (Daniel Schacter ed., 1995) (“If you recall the [Indian Wars] . . . as part of the
history of nation-building, it is one story; if you recall it as part of a history of racism it is another.”).
362
Charles Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WISC. L.
REV. 375.
363
See Aviam Soifer, Objects in the Mirror Are Closer Than They Appear, 28 GA. L. REV. 533, 553 (1994) (labeling “failures of
memory” that resulting in the discounting of Indian claims for redress “legal amnesia” and characterizing this process as an act of
indeliberate injustice). Unconscious psychological processes shield individuals from the pain of awareness of past atrocities and
prevent them from having to grapple with present obligations to provide redress. Martha Minow, The Work of re-Membering:
After Genocide and Mass Atrocity, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 429, 429 (1999).
364
See Aviam Soifer, Redress, Progress, and the Benchmark Problem, 40 B.C. L. REV. 525, 526 (1998) (“The prevailing
presumption is that somehow, sometime—perhaps when we weren’t paying attention—sufficient justice and equality came to
prevail. Therefore . . . we all now enjoy an equal, fair start in the cosmic race of life. We hold tightly to this credo as if it were
self-evident, no matter what the actual evidence may be.”)
365
See Wacks, supra note 315, at 221-24 (suggesting that although federal, State, and local governments would assist with
funding and logistics any TRC created to advance the cause of racial reconciliation in the U.S. must retain formal independence
in order to preserve neutrality and functionality); see also Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth
Commission Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 AZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L 1017
(2001) (discussing proposal to create such a TRC).
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Membership of the American Indian Reconciliation Commission [“AIRC”] would consist of
equal numbers of Indians and non-Indians and include tribal chairpersons and national elected officials;
jurists, lawyers, and scholars versant in federal Indian law, tribal legal systems, and indigenous rights
regimes; and clergy. Drawing upon the experiences of precedent TRCs, AIRC would identify sites across
the U.S., such as Indian reservations, major urban centers with significant Indian populations, and
universities, where fora would be established to which tribes and individual Indians could submit requests
to testify.366 Requests might be reduced to writing on a standard form, filed with the closest forum, and
considered by a committee established for that purpose.
AIRC would broadcast hearings and testimony on public media and a website, and transcripts
would be circulated in newspapers to facilitate transparency and the wide dissemination of Indian stories.
Although certain testimony, such as oral histories of the massacres of defenseless Indian civilians that
have been passed down through the generations, might shock listeners,367 since nothing could conceivably
implicate living persons in any criminal activity AIRC need not keep secret witness identities, nor would
it need to grant amnesty. Victims would receive a certificate recognizing their contribution to truthtelling
and reconciliation.368 Upon conclusion of its hearings, AIRC would send a Final Report to Congress and
the President with nonbinding remedial recommendations, to include apologies, compensation, land
restoration, and other measures to promote and protect self-determination.
B. Apologies
369

“Any good thing you say to me shall not be forgotten.”

The second step in the application of JAI to the question of Indian justice is the grant of an
apology to Indians. JAI assumes that the AIRC hearings are likely to cause many citizens to experience
the moral taint of the history of U.S. treatment of Indians for the first time.370 After persuading many
citizens to acknowledge harm to Indian tribes and individuals, AIRC should next direct the U.S. to relieve
the burden of its national guilt-complex371 while advancing the process toward forgiveness by
recommending in its Final Report that the U.S. government issue a formal apology, on behalf of the U.S.
and all its citizens past and present, as symbolic recognition of the role of public and private actors in past
acts of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide.372 National church and corporate boards might apologize for

366

For those unable or unwilling to testify publicly, testimony might be taken through deposition, affidavit, or by other means.
If testimony does not disturb, it does not serve truthtelling or deterrence. See Minow, supra note 342, at 429 (“if we are not
shocked . . . we have forgotten to remember, ‘Never again.’”).
368
See Wacks, supra note 315, at 233.
369
Ten Bears, Comanche.
370
“Moral taint” is defined as the complex of emotions and thoughts experienced by a group of persons who come to accept an
“association with wrongful behavior over which they had no control and therefore for which, under traditional individualistic
premises, they carry no blame.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 709.
371
WHITE, supra note 210, at 273.
372
An apology need not address contemporary effects of past discrimination to initiate reconciliation; to do so might trench upon
terrain too sensitive for a present-day majority whose willingness to concede national fallibility may be merely retrospective. An
apology might track with the letter accompanying compensation to Japanese Americans:
The United States acknowledges the historic significance of its illegal and immoral actions and expresses its deep
regret to the Indian people. Money and words alone cannot restore lost ancestors or lands, or erase painful memories;
neither can they fully convey American resolve to rectify injustice, but the U.S. recognizes that serious injustices were
done to Indians over the course of the creation and expansion of the U.S. In enacting a law calling for restitution and
reconciliation and offering a sincere apology, your fellow Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their
traditional commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice. The Nation humbly asks for your forgiveness.
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acts in which these institutions were complicit.

An appropriate apology must incorporate recognition of

a corresponding moral, if not legal, obligation to negotiate the next stage of JAI: peacemaking.
C. Peacemaking
“If their minds are clean, and if they are obedient and promise to obey . . . they shall be welcome.”
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1. Cultural Hermeneutics
If a theory of justice is to span the chasm between peoples, ideas, and objectives, its enunciation
and implementation will require negotiation.375 Although their resilience is unquestionable after a halfmillennium of extreme challenges, Indian tribes are now too numerically and militarily inferior to impose
solutions by force; on the other hand, reason, principle, moral obligations, and the aspirational values of a
constitutional, republic erected upon prior sovereigns with whom it is interdependent conspire to restrain
the U.S.376 While the conflict has been waged primarily on battlefields and in courtrooms, the origins are
rooted largely in cultural differences difficult to exaggerate: the “problem of learning how meaning in one
system of expression is expressed in another” is one of the “most difficult tasks we confront in a
multicultural world.”377 Recognition of mutual sovereignty—a companion obligation to the establishment
of a multicultural ethic of respect—will require a cross-cultural hermeneutics, which in turn mandates the
clearing of barriers to communication and the sharing of stories, fears, hopes, and dreams. By restoring a
large measure of legal personality to Indian tribes,378 identifying shared interests obscured by history and
emotion, tempering tendencies toward extremism, and tutoring both parties in the common humanity of
each other, U.S.-Indian negotiations can usher in a new era of peace and justice. Fittingly, the ancient
Indian method of dispute resolution known as Tribal Peacemaking (“TPM”)379 can guide the journey
toward greater mutual understanding and trust.
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Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility, and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 70 (1995).
The Law of Great Peace, Iroquois (1750)
375
Currently, a federal statute prevents recognition of Indian tribes as nations with whom the U.S. may contract by treaty. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §71 (1994). Repeal of this statute—a demand of many
Indian tribes—would revive the principle of mutual sovereignty and infuse negotiations with the ethics of mutual respect and
consent so vital to the process of atonement, forgiveness, and reconciliation. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves:
Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 970-72, 979-80 (1996) (arguing that the historical treaty
process should serve as a template for a contemporary framework of U.S.-tribal negotiations between mutual sovereigns).
376
See ANAYA, supra note 104, at 130 (stressing that where a state acquired its sovereignty by displacing original sovereigns it
incurs the obligation—moral if not necessarily legal—to “foster the capacity of Natives to govern their own communities as well
as contribute to the development of all our peoples, indigenous or immigrant.”). Constitutional republics are particularly
committed, at least as a matter of political theory, to tolerating dissent as a bulwark against repressive hierarchy. Daniel A.
Farber, Richmond and Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 623 (1989) (noting commitments of neo-republican governments to
tolerance of dissent and negotiated compromise). Persuasion, in contrast to domination, is currency of the realm in the liberal
constitutional republic, and the most convertible denomination is U.S. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 348, at 107 (stating
that because in democracies the laws are reflective of the will of the people, those who wish to modify the laws must “either
change the opinion of the nation, or trample upon its decision”).
377
Williams, supra note _, at 1039-49.
378
See Frickey, supra note 71, at 1783-84 (aguing that negotiation on neutral sites, in contrast to adjudication in the courts of the
conqueror, grants subordinated groups equal ownership of, and responsibility for, the resolution of their disputes with the
dominant power); Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the
Indian Gaming Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 35- 37 (1997) (contending that because the exercise of majoritarian political preference
dictates that tribal rights cannot be fairly adjudicated in courts of the United States, negotiation, though also risky, is the only path
through the minefield of power and prejudice). Still, while the post-Cold War era is a fruitful moment to discuss enlargement of
the international legal personality of nonstate actors as international law becomes ever-more concerned with the “ought” and not
simply with the “is,” the U.S. has not committed to the vision of mutual sovereignty advocated by these Indian scholars.
379
See Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience, The Dynamic Challenge of Lawyers’ Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27
U. TOL. L. REV. 821, 835 (1996) (defining TPM as “any system of dispute resolution used within [an Indian] community which
utilizes non-adversarial strategies . . . [and] incorporates some traditional or customary approaches . . . the aim of which is
conciliation and the restoration of peace and harmony.”). TPM weds ancient and abiding values to dispute resolution techniques
44
374

2. Tribal Peacemaking (TPM)
TPM heals wounds by publicly and ceremonially deploying spiritual380 norms and collected tribal
wisdom, listening compassionately to the widest possible circle of people, and reminding participants of
their relational obligations to one another.381 Rather than address only disputants, TPM balances the
intellectual, emotional, and physical dimensions of the entire tribe on its journey toward restoration.382
Despite its nonpunitive foundations,383 TPM can provide effective redress for offenses as serious as
robbery, rape, and murder.384
a. procedures
TPM reflects the interests of parties against the backdrop of tribal norms, and behavior-altering
mechanisms—anger, shame,385 embarrassment, and encouragement—modify negotiating positions and
guide parties toward harmony. Neither lawyers nor judges are present. All who know the parties or are
familiar with the history of the dispute are required to sit together in a circle.386 The oral procedure is
supervised by a “peacemaker” who is an exemplar of tribal virtues387 yet possesses merely persuasive
rather than compulsory powers: his obligations do not extend further than inducing people to talk to one
another by exemplifying tribal values and ways.388 The peacemaker is not neutral: he or she has the
respect of the parties, who are frequently related to him or her by blood or marriage.389 Thus, the parties
appropriate to the pluralist context in which tribes are now situated. It profoundly transformed Indian conceptions of justice since
its reintroduction in the 1970s. Although the particular dispute resolution methods employed by any particular tribe are distinct
as from every other in that they are the experiential products of the unique culture, history, and wisdom of that tribe, it is possible
to describe TPM in theoretical abstract.
380
TPM recognizes no separation of religious and secular, and supernatural power is directed to overcome disharmony and
reestablish order. Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat’aanii: The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10
MEDIATION Q. 327, 332 (1993).
381
See Dianne LeResche, Editor’s Notes, Native American Perpsectives on Peacemaking, 10 MEDIATION Q. 321, 321 (1993).
382
Id. at 321-22. TPM is rarely used in disputes between members of different tribes. See Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute
Resolution and Promissory Obligations: Continuity and Change in The Largest Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
1, 16 (1993) (noting that where outsiders are involved in disputes with members of Indian tribes, particularly where physical
injuries are involved, the absence of common ties of kinship, religion, community, and ethos that drive the process of Indian
dispute resolution and encourage parties to remove the conflict from the adversarial plane tend to preclude the success of such an
enterprise); see also Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REG. U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1998)
(noting that while elements of TPM, termed “restorative justice,” have been introduced into non-Indian contexts such as family
group conferences, “community injury,” and victim/offender mediation, these efforts have not met with anticipated success,
largely because urbanized, atomized settings do not offer the “spiritual glue” of communal obligations to condition individual
conduct). In essence, so central to the successful functioning is the commitment to shared tribal values and responsibilities that
extension of TPM beyond the boundaries of the reservation or beyond the subject matter of disputes between tribal members is
inherently problematic. Nonetheless, where individuals are linked not by membership in a political community but by common
commitments to justice and to restoration, TPM retains its potential to heal. See generally William C. Bradford, Reclaiming
Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to Peaceful Coexistence: the Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking,
76 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 551 (2000).
383
TPM is decidedly nonpunitive in its philosophical underpinnings: in contrast to state adjudication, no central authority can
directly apply coercion to enforce the collective will. Id.
384
See Lieder, supra note 382, at 17-18
385
See Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV.
1003, 1015 (1997) (describing how, within the tightly interconnected tribe, the technique of shaming—calling down personal
criticism upon one who deviates from group norms—can induce those who wish to remain accepted within the tribe to modify
contrarian positions in order to bring themselves into a state of harmony with others).
386
See Bernard, supra note 379, at 830.
387
See LeResche, supra note 381, at 321 (demonstrating that one of the most important criteria in the selection of “leaders” of
traditional Indian tribal societies was skill in mediating intragroup hostility). Research suggests that selection as leaders of those
with skill in dispute resolution may be a common characteristic of the tribal level of sociopolitical organization. See, e.g., Walter
Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L. J. 323, 352-53 (1993)
(identifying the main criteria for chiefdom among the Roma as “intelligence and a sense of fairness” in resolving group disputes).
388
See Costello, supra note 181, at 887
389
See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 380, at 329 (explaining that the “core of common law” of Indian legal systems is the
“lineage system,” a method of tracing relationships and adjusting disputes between people with the assistance of clan and family
members whose influence constituted a form of “ingrained emotional cement.”).
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are strongly inclined to follow proffered “guidance” encouraging them to live up to their communal
responsibilities, grant apologies and restitution,391 and depart “with their tails up [rather than one] with a
tail up, one with a tail down.”392
b. peacemaker
The peacemaker typically enters the peace circle393 to lead a prayer summoning the aid of the
supernatural and framing the attitudes of the parties. The peacemaker then listens to all subjective points
of view to determine the reasons for disharmony. In loosely structured discussion, feelings and emotions
are recognized as equally important to reason, and all persons are required to directly confront the full
consequences of their actions, including the injustice done and the resultant harm.394 Emphasizing future
relations rather than the legal consequences of past events, the peacemaker (1) presents a lecture on how
or why the parties have violated tribal values and breached tribal solidarity,395 (2) leads a discussion of
practical means whereby the parties can end the dispute, and (3) suggests how all can conform future
conduct to values reflective of tribal relational aspects and rights to justice and harmony.
c. remedies
Remedies are generally implemented without resistance. As agreements are the product of a
consensus, the personal honor and communal obligation of the wrongdoer(s) is pre-enlisted in support of
compliance. Further, TPM recruits extended family and friends as “probation officers” with
“responsibility to the victims and communities to prevent the wrongdoer from causing further harm.”396
Moreover, given the powerful psychological sanctions available to the tribe in the form of ridicule,
ostracism, and banishment, a wrongdoer’s need to remain in good stead is easily exploited.397
390

See id. at 332. For the peacemaker there is explicit stress upon an affirmative, interventionist role in maneuvering parties back
to harmony by reference to traditional values. In the language of mainstream alternative dispute resolution, the TPM peacemaker
can be cast as a directive and activist mediator whose expertise in the particular substantive domain in which the dispute occurs
permits him to thrust himself into the conflict and make judicious use of persuasion, influence, and judgments to achieve concrete
settlement of an otherwise elusive problem. Nevertheless, TPM is neither mediation nor arbitration as understood by the Western
mind as such terms do not capture its inherently spiritual, communal, and restorative essence. Id. at 335.
391
See ANDERSON, supra note 235 (noting that TPM almost never offers the guilt of the accused as the “question presented”;
rather, the gap separating parties is generally the amount of restitution, either material or services, to be paid, and this amount is
the subject of bargaining, negotiation, and intervention by the peacemaker).
392
LeResche, supra note 381, at 322
393
The circle is sacred in many Indian religions as the circle of life, a “delicate thread that unites all living things.” Darla J.
Mondou, Our Land is What Makes Us Who We Are: Timber Harvesting on Tribal Reservations After the NIFRMA, 21 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 259, 259 91997). The path of life follows a circular progression and thus does not have a beginning and an end
in linear time but is part of a journey connected to all other living things. Use of the circle in TPM expresses spiritual rootedness
to all creation: every person sitting in the circle focuses upon the peacemaker who moves the dispute from the circumference to
the center so all four quadrants (spiritual, emotional, physical, and intellectual) reenter balance and recomprise a united whole.
394
“[TPM] addresses denial, minimalization and externalization in ways that [mainstream] systems cannot do. In a given
[mainstream] system, proving the facts of a case is difficult and burdensome. In criminal systems with the privilege against selfincrimination, defendants cannot be compelled to discuss motives, attitudes, . . . or causes of misconduct. In [TPM], which does
not utilize punishment, people are free to “talk out” the problem fully and get at the psychological barriers which impede a
practical solution.” Zion & Yazzie, supra note 34, at 81.
395
See Cruz, supra note 144, at 581-82. Breaches of tribal solidarity are occasioned by individuals who place greater emphasis
upon their needs and desires than they do upon the interests of the tribe. Id.
396
Costello, supra note 181, at 899-900.
397
Research at the intersection between political economics and anthropology suggests that the tribe performs an essential
insurance function by facilitating survival tasks that can only be performed in teams: tribal members, in exchange for this
insurance, grant their loyalty unreservedly. As a product of these mutually advantageous intratribal interactions and the ease of
observing and transmitting information and norms within the small community, the problem of monitoring to prevent free-riding
inherent in team production disappears. Not only does the tribe reduce or eliminate bad-faith incentives to opportunism or
cheating, but expulsion, ostracism, and other forms of collective refusal to deal, highly effective sanctions given the importance
of individual reputation in a small interdependent circle, are far more efficient than formal legal enforcement mechanisms.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 245-47 (1979). Research into
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d. U.S.-Indian TPM Conference (USITPMC)
The U.S.-Indian TPM Conference (“USITPMC) would be conducted shortly after AIRC
concluded its final report and before the drafting of proposed legislative reforms. USITPMC might enlist
the most respected elder Indian and non-Indian statesmen as peacemakers to supervise, lead, and guide
negotiations as to remedies for the redress of Indian claims.398 Such persons would collect and merge
spiritual and secular values common to both Indian and non-Indian cultures and urge negotiators to
envision a future when all U.S. citizens, Indian and non-Indian, are full and equal members of one great
nation. Peacemakers would urge the U.S. to confront again the history of genocide, land theft, and
ethnocide, renew the apology to Indian tribes and people, and suggest remedies that would restore dignity
and demonstrate a genuine desire to live up to the highest values enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence. Peacemakers would also encourage Indian nations to express their suffering but to be
forgiving and willing to start relations with the U.S. anew, freed of the burdens of a painful history.
USITPMC might meet at a series of venues, including sacred tribal lands and U.S. retreats such as Camp
David. Although the recommendations of USITPMC need not be binding, remedies agreed upon could
be committed to paper and transmitted to Congress as the basis for legislative action.
D. Commemoration
“It does not require many words to speak the truth.”
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The next step in the process of implementing JAI theory—commemoration of the history of
genocide, land theft, and ethnocide—is necessary to ensure that future generations will neither forget nor
perpetuate the injustice toward the original inhabitants of the U.S. Erection of monuments at sites of
Indian genocide400 and on the National Mall,401 naming of public buildings and parks after Indians of
historical significance, and creation of a wing in the National Museum of the American Indian with
specific focus on the gross human injustices suffered by Indian people will serve these transformative and
deterrent purposes.402 Posthumous pardons should be granted to Indians executed for resisting genocide
other tribal legal systems supports the finding that psychological pressure is at least as effective in securing compliance as the
formal institutions of state coercion. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 387, at 358-59 (noting that among the Roma, the
permanent sentence of marime (“impurity” requiring ostracism) is the equivalent of a death penalty since the permanent outcast,
subjected to the shunning of the entire Roma community, is frequently driven to suicide); see also Posner, supra this note, at 182
n.144 (describing how Amish wrongdoers make public confessions lest they be shunned, a fate which results in the deviant
member becoming a social pariah with whom no one will eat, speak, or do business).
398
Peacemakers would not be granted authority to commit their respective nations unless agreed-to prior to USITPM.
399
Chief Joseph, Nez Perce.
400
The value of memorials to the preservation of history and the attitudinal reform of citizens is inestimable. In 1881 the U.S. set
th
aside land to honor U.S. soldiers of the 7 Cavalry who fell with Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn River in 1878. No
mention was made of the Indian soldiers whose victory checked, even if for a short time, the advance of settlers into their lands.
However, in 1991, the U.S. renamed Custer Battlefield as Little Bighorn Battlefield and hired an Indian as Superintendent, and in
November1999 groundbreaking for the Indian Memorial at Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument. The Indian Memorial
will include a “spirit gate” to welcome all the dead and, according to its designer, to “symbolize the mutual understanding of the
infinite all the dead posses.” See Bert Gildart, Two Sides of Little Bighorn, MIL. HIST. (June 2001), at 27-28. According to
curator Kitty Deernose, “Everyone feels more welcome now for the story includes comments from those who won rather than by
just those who lost. Ironically, people from all ethnic groups seem to like that.” Id. Many more such memorials could dot the
U.S. landscape: AIRC should recommend sites to Congress where memorials to other gross injustices can be created.
401
Critics might find in this an example of a “memorial fever” sweeping the nation and causing interest groups to “fiercely
compete for space on the most hallowed memorial space in the nation[.]” Elaine Sciolino, Fighting For Space in Memorial
Heaven, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2001, at A18 (noting critics who claim that a “growing tendency to memorialize individual
groups” and to “car[ve] the nation in ever-thinner slices of hyphenated Americans divides rather than unites the country.”).
402
The National Holocaust Museum might serve as a model for a planned National Museum of the American Indian. See 20
U.S.C. §§80q to 80q-15 (“National Museum of the Indian Act”) (Supp. 1990). Exhibits might include original copies of U.SIndian treaties along with subsequent histories and specific dates and circumstances of U.S. breaches. Histories of tribes, from
47

403

and land expropriation.

404

Establishment and funding of cultural, historical, linguistic, and religious

centers405 will regenerate sources of tribal cohesion while offering non-Indians the opportunity to adjust
their perceptions of Indian culture and religion toward understanding and tolerance. While the object of
JAI theory is to unite rather than to divide peoples, the mythical version of history from which the
genocide, land theft, and ethnocide of Indians has been redacted no longer functions as political adhesive.
Historical revision, in the most visible and tangible manner possible, is necessary to restore the
gravitational force between disparate groups in the American polity, and, particularly where history has
not been co-authored by subordinated groups, memorials are an appropriate way to initiate this process.
In sum, commemoration will concretize the findings of AIRC and the USITPM and inscribe the
unvarnished history of U.S.-Indian relations in the minds and hearts of successive generations of
Americans, both Indian and non-Indian. Thus, commemoration functions as a sort of moral commitment
device that speaks the message, “Never again,” in a language accessible to all.
E. Compensation
“Do not touch the money of the white man or his clothes. We do not fight for these things. The Seminole is fighting for his
hunting grounds.”

406

It is impossible to objectively quantify the value of the injuries inflicted upon Indian people over
history, and morally odious to try.407 Moreover, compensation cannot reach, let alone discharge, the
wrongful deaths of ancestors, the denial of the use of tribal lands and resources, and legal assaults on
Indian religions, languages, and cultures. These harms can never be repaired with money, and JAI theory
would regard any wealth transfer from the U.S. as a symbolic act undertaken in further recognition of
moral responsibility, rather than a settlement of claims for loss, grief, and trauma. Although endowment
of a fund sufficient to allow tribes to repurchase some lands and to serve as a social support net for the
poorest Indian individuals, and in particular off-reservation Indians who do not presently enjoy the legal,
medical, and educational entitlements their tribal counterparts receive,408 would not be incompatible with

first contact to dispossession and genocide to the present, could be preserved in rich detail. Names of Indian individuals
murdered might be inscribed on a national register, and certificates could be issued to descendants of each victim
commemorating the circumstances of their deaths. Indian curators with tribal cultural and historical knowledge would play an
important role in the establishment and development of all aspects of the Museum, which is scheduled to open in fall 2004.
403
See Steven Braun, Clemency for Hanged Man Delivers Justice Long Awaited, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2001, at A10 (noting
Maryland gubernatorial grant of posthumous pardon to black man executed for rape of white woman in 1917 after a trial held in a
climate of mob violence); Chomsky, supra note 61 (discussing execution of Dakota warriors for defending their territories from
invasion by the U.S. in violation of a treaty).
404
Existing institutions might be assisted in discharging this function, possibly as a central archive with satellite branches across
the U.S. and in tribal colleges or in consortium with other institutions. See, e.g., the D’Arcy McNickle Center for American
Indian History of the Newberry Library, the foremost institution for Indian studies (http://www.newberry.org).
405
As the cost of higher education is one of the greatest obstacles to Indian students, scholarship grants to attend the thirty-three
Indian tribal colleges and universities would be appropriate. The American Indian Higher Education Consortium, an
organization founded in 1972 by presidents of tribal colleges to support higher Indian education, might be tapped to administer an
Indian Educational Trust to benefit financially needy Indian students. See http://www.aihec.org.
406
Osceola, Seminole.
407
The harm suffered is inherently inestimable to peoples for whom ancestors, land, and culture are spiritually interwoven and
constitutive of identity in a manner irreducible to comprehension by Western legal minds. Moreover, any proposed sum might
stoke the perception of greed or suggest that the real motivation for redress is vindictive and goad the majority into backlash.
408
Wacks, supra note 315, at 209 (suggesting cash is the most desirable remedy for the poorest victims of injustices). The amount
necessary to sustain such a trust fund, though significant, is certain to be far less than the $1 trillion or more that could potentially
be claimed as reparations. See supra at pp._. A fund endowed with a per capita sum of $10,000 for the nearly 2 million Indians
would total $20 billion. Some or all might be raised through grants in fee simple of federal surplus lands and resource rights to
Indian tribes. Revenue-sharing from sales of leases of natural resource rights on former Indian lands, abeyance of taxation on
Indian incomes (presently, most Indian income, whether earned on- or off-reservation, is taxable, see Superintendent of Five
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the application of JAI theory to the question of justice for Indians, money is simply an unimportant, and
potentially even a dispensable, element of JAI theory.
F. Land Restoration
“The ground on which we stand is sacred ground. It is the dust and blood of our ancestors.”

409

One of the most difficult stages in applying JAI theory will be the process of land restoration.
Scholars have posited that the diffusion of transnational rights-based arguments claiming the sanctity of
private property and objections to unjust enrichment may have generated a more favorable political and
legal climate for restitution of Indian lands.410 However, even if preceding stages in JAI commit the U.S.
and its people in theory to do “justice,” it will prove far more difficult in practice to reach an agreement
with Indian tribes as to what measures must be implemented to yield a “just” result, and still more
difficult to cobble together legislation implementing agreed-upon measures without catalyzing opposition.
For much of the non-Indian majority, a land restoration agenda resonates not as the legal obligation of a
constitutional republic descended heavily upon prior sovereigns but rather as an existential threat.
Indeed, non-Indians are Americans too, and they have nowhere to go if transformations in land tenure
regimes evict them from their homes. Broaching the subject of land restoration with a non-Indian can
trigger defensive backlash: as a white businessman huffs, “I didn’t persecute anybody at Plymouth Rock .
. . This is the 1990s. We didn’t do anything to them, and we don’t owe them anything.”411
Nonetheless, while it concedes that centuries after the facts of expropriation it is “too late now to
develop a theory of land law that would throw the whole structure of land title . . . into confusion[,]”412
JAI straightforwardly insists that Indians are entitled to the restoration of their ancestral lands to the
furthest limits of reason and equity.413 A necessary precondition for the exercise of the powers of selfgovernment, the generation of wealth, the propagation of culture, and the expression of religious belief is
the secure possession of a physical space upon which to center these forms of human endeavor and from
which it is possible to exclude others hostile to these activities. Where Indians have ceded lands in a
process free from coercion, fraud, or duress, such cessions are to be respected categorically, along with
the private entitlements of those individuals and corporations currently in possession of such lands.
However, where Indian lands were seized by force-of-arms or by coercive, duressive, or fraudulent
dealings, or where the lands in question are uniquely sacred to a tribe, JAI requires as a general rule that
those specific lands be restored to the ownership of the tribes from which they were taken. Only where
this would prove so disruptive to the settled expectations of blameless present landowners that it would
threaten social peace414 or otherwise inflict gross injustice would alternative arrangements for remediation
of Indian land claims be considered.
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That restoration of rights in Indian lands will inflict unwarranted hardship on non-Indian
possessors is not lightly to be presumed. Even if the U.S. becomes genuinely committed to this project of
land restoration, no serious person believes that the U.S. is “about to divest itself or its non-Indian citizens
of large acreage in the name of its own laws.”415 One need not ascribe without qualification to the critical
legal studies premise that “law is politics” 416to recognize that the conceptual boundaries between law and
politics break down rather easily in regard to the question of Indian rights in land. Moreover, although
the “Great Fear”417 of many non-Indian possessors of residential real estate, family farms, and small
businesses is that the assertion of Indian claims to land will eventually lead to their ejection and
impoverishment,418 this concern need not be justified in practice, for JAI theory unequivocally proscribes
the involuntary dispossession of non-Indians, as well as the uncompensated takings of their
improvements.419 Although JAR theory is unabashedly disinterested in the fate of non-Indians now
residing upon lands claimed by Indians, JAI, noting that “one incorporates these non-Indian interests as
relevant to the question of justice and notes that “one can search high and low, and never find an instance
in which Indians have advocated that small property owners be pushed off the land in order to satisfy land
claims,”420 regards non-Indian interests as morally relevant.421
Accordingly, JAI insists that the transfer of sovereignty over territory need not disturb private
land titles:422 Indian tribes reinvested with powers of public sovereignty over lands now settled by nonIndians are free to recognize some or all of these private titles, and, despite the anomaly of M’Intosh423,
neither public international law nor JAI theory encourages the notion that a change in sovereignty is
destructive of the system of land titles established by the prior sovereign.424 The public right of
sovereignty, defined as the ultimate dominion over territory and the power to make and enforce laws, is
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conceptually and practically distinct from the private right of “ownership,” conceived as the power to
make individual decisions as to the use and alienation of land.425 As a general rule, JAI envisions that the
process of land restoration will be undertaken in the least disruptive fashion possible: non-Indians are
encouraged to remain in possession of their real property entitlements on the sole condition that they
agree to live in peace with their Indian neighbors under Indian sovereignty.426 Non-Indian titles would
either be left totally undisturbed by the transfer in sovereignty or, at the very least, non-Indians would be
entitled to just compensation and other relief for the taking of their property.427
Furthermore, should non-Indians elect not to accept Indian sovereignty subsequent to the program
of restoration, JAI proposes that, rather than bring actions in ejectment, tribes consider either granting
these parties long-term leases on fair market terms to be negotiated,428 thereby granting de facto autonomy
to the extent compatible with the exercise of Indian sovereignty over the remainder interests. Such lease
agreements might incorporate terms providing compensation for lost rental earnings and damages for
prior trespass and might have the effect of terminating all prior claims relating to the leased parcels.429
Still, where restoration would clearly inflict gross injustice upon blameless non-Indian possessors, and the
land in question is not sacred, JAI is prepared to accept in-kind grants from federal landholdings in lieu.
More than 650 million acres of federal lands are held in public trust for purposes of grazing,
forestry, wilderness, and other uses and managed by federal agencies, in particular the Bureau of Land
Management.430 Current federal law provides that the homeless receive first priority for use of “surplus”
federal land and property.431 The General Services Agency (“GSA”) administers conveyance of surplus
federal land and orders sale when there is no federal use to the private sector for fair market value, either
through sealed-bid competition, public auction, or mail auction.432 Although Indian tribes are permitted to
acquire surplus federal lands, the trust doctrine continues to impose, through extensive federal regulations
and Secretarial oversight and veto power, obstacles to land acquisition.433 A minimalist approach to
expansion of the tribal land base might transform the role of the Secretary of the Interior in regard to
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surplus land acquisitions from gatekeeper to facilitator; the National Congress of American Indians Land
Recovery Task Force has offered proposals to this end, but no implementing action has been taken.434
More extensive legislative proposals might provide that some or all of federal surplus lands be
435

granted to Indian tribes in proportion to the acreage of their existing land claims against the U.S.

Millions of acres of Western States such as Nevada, currently under federal control, might be allotted to
tribes for occupancy, resource extraction, rental, or even in fee simple. In lands granted in fee, the U.S.
might negotiate the reservation of leases, easements, or other rights of usufruct for the benefit of nonIndians.436 Although such a proposal might not directly restore sacred lands, it would enable tribes to sell
recently acquired federal surplus acreage and resources for the purpose of purchasing sacred lands.
The most expansive measure calls for the creation of a “Buffalo Commons” [“BC”] centered
upon nearly 150,000 square miles of territory in 110 counties situated in a broad swath extending from
Texas and New Mexico north to the Canadian border through Oklahoma, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas,
Wyoming, North and South Dakota, and Montana.437 The vast majority of this territory consists of lands
that were never lawfully ceded to the U.S. and to which Indian tribes therefore remain legally entitled.438
To this land mass—currently occupied by a sparse and dispersed non-Indian population of only
400,000—advocates of the BC would seek to append the unceded lands of over a dozen other Indian
tribes,439 a land mass encompassing an additional 100 bordering counties, the Great Basin and Sonoran
Desert, those parts of several other States (Utah, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, and New
Mexico) designated surplus federal lands or land otherwise held in public trust, adjacent grasslands,
national forests, military bases, and existing Indian reservations. Tribes claiming lands not within the
area described in the BC might negotiate with the U.S. and tribes the acceptance of grants of land within
the BC in exchange for the surrender of claims, and tribes within the BC would negotiate arrangements
for joint use of its resources.440 Although proponents of the BC stress that it is possible to facilitate the
return of “every square inch of unceded Indian Country in the [U.S.] without tossing a single non-Indian
homeowner off the land on which they [sic] now live[,]” individual non-Indians electing not to remain
living in and accept Indian sovereignty over this “North American Union of Indigenous Nations” would
be paid just compensation for the cession of their property interests by the U.S.441
In sum, the recovery of a land mass sufficient to create the material preconditions for economic
self-determination, religious freedom, and self-governance is crucial, and thus JAI proposes land
434

See 64 Fed. Reg. 17, 574—17, 588 (April 12, 1999) (proposing modifications to, inter alia, limit discretionary power of federal
agencies and officials, particularly with respect to the purposes for which such lands are acquired).
435
See ROBERT WARRIOR, LIKE A HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED
KNEE (1996) (describing early such discussions in late 1960s and 1970s).
436
See Carlos Scott Lopez, Reformulating Native Title in Mabo’s Wake: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Reconciliation in PostCentenary Australia, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 21, 79 (2003) (describing a “joint sovereignty proposal” that would
enable restoration of land to indigenous peoples without denying non-indigenous peoples some rights in restored lands).
437
See CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 384-87 (elaborating the “Buffalo Commons” proposal whereby to accomplish land
restoration and enhance the prospects for Indian self-governance without compromising the rights of non-Indians).
438
See supra note 303. Much of the land mass constituting what would become the core of the BC is the ancestral territory of a
small number of tribes, including the Lakota, Pawnee, Arikara, Hidatsa, Crow, Shoshone, Assiniboine, Cheyenne, Araphao,
Kiowa, Comanche, and the Jicarilla, and Mescalero Apache. CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 384-85.
439
See id. (noting that the lands of the Blackfeet, Salish, Kutenai, Nez Perce, Yakima, Western Shoshone, Goshutes, Utes,
Paiutes, Navajo, Hopi, Chiricahua Apache, Havasupi, Yavapai, and O’odham were never lawfully ceded to the U.S.).
440
Id. at 386-87.
441
Id. at 383, 390.
52

restoration to the furthest limits possible short of imposing injustice on non-Indians. To this extent, it is
far more aggressive on the issue of land rights than JAS or JAC. Nevertheless, JAI is far more sensitive
to the rights of non-Indians and to the political realities attendant to territorial questions—an issue of
“high politics”—than is JAS. Although undoing the present consequences of historical force and fraud
will invariably entail a major reallocation of some degree of public sovereignty to Indian tribes, JAI
maintains that this process need not compromise the settled rights and expectations of blameless nonIndians and their descendants. Hundreds of millions of acres exist in connection with which there are few
conflicting claims. By negotiating a creative strategy for identifying suitable and appropriate lands
wherein to transfer some quantum of sovereignty, whether along the lines of the BC proposal or in some
lesser degree, and by jointly committing to the preservation of the private property rights of non-Indians
resident upon lands over which sovereignty is transferred or else accepting the responsibility to pay
compensation for the taking of these rights, Indian tribes and the U.S. can author a restorative program
that will prevent or internalize the demoralization costs associated with uncompensated expropriation past
or present and preserve the political and territorial integrity of the U.S.
G. Legal Reformation
If land restoration portends challenges, the penultimate step of JAI promises even more.
Although the restoration of lands to tribes is a partial measure toward redress, JAI, unlike existing
theories of justice, specifies a program of legal reformation as the critical stage in concretizing other
remedies and, above all, in clearing away obstacles to the expression of Indian self-determination. Taken
together, the legal doctrines of discovery and conquest, as incorporated in domestic law, as well as a
judicially unenforceable trust doctrine, plenary power, and the subversion of Indian rights reserved under
treaties constitute an interconnected matrix of legal disability that refers Indian rights to property, culture,
religion, development, and self-government, no matter how broadly any given generation of non-Indians
might choose to construct and protect them, to perpetual reinterpretation, appropriation, and suppression
by future non-Indian majorities and hostile judges. That a system of law imported and imposed by a
settler state should hobble the rights of an indigenous people is an oft-repeated story across the globe; that
this system must be transformed if the impediments are to be swept away and those rights secured to their
bearers is a proposition that follows logically but has largely gone unstated heretofore by theoreticians
concerned with justice on behalf of Indians.442 Accordingly, legal reform, oriented toward the reservation
of this bundle of Indian rights as against non-Indian majorities, occupies the apex of the remedial pyramid
JAI directs its proponents to construct. Until Indians are free to engage in meaningful selfdetermination—in other words, until either the U.S. is prepared to grant a substantial measure of
territorial autonomy or at the very least legally tolerate the coexistence of basic value- and culturaldifferences that often spark conflict between Indians and non-Indians—the struggle to achieve the
objectives of JAI will remain incomplete.
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The first question that must be answered in designing an appropriate package of legal reform
proposals is whether, and to what extent, the U.S. is willing to allow Indian tribes to invest the phrase
self-determination with real meaning.
1. Indian Self-Determination
The customary international legal principle of self-determination provides that social, political,
and economic institutions should be substantially and continuously guided not by alien or colonial powers
but by the will of the governed.443 Under international law, states are duty-bound to promote the selfdetermination, and therefore the independent and unmediated social, political, and economic
development, of their indigenous peoples.444 Taken to its logical extreme, obligations to enable selfdetermination may be construed to require states to permit their indigenous peoples the right to secede
from their parent states and form independent states,445 as well as to require other preexisting states to
recognize these newly-independent states, particularly where the peoples in question are subject to alien
domination or hobbled in the “meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally.”446
Thus, an Indian tribe with a population, territorial base, government, and the capacity to enter into
international relations could in theory declare independence and gain international recognition.447
Arguably, Indian nations, as a matter of international law, continue to possess the right that existed prior
to contact with European discoverers to create their own forms of organization without reference to the
states in which they are now situated.448 Some Indian rights advocates suggest that only full tribal
sovereignty in the form of independent nation-states recognized as such by other members of the
international community can overcome the disabilities imposed by federal Indian law.449 However,
although the history of U.S.-Indian relations strongly suggests that Indian interests and those of the U.S.
majority are not often commensurable, any proposal to compromise the territorial integrity of the U.S. is
unlikely to be met with anything but the most hostile of responses in majoritarian political circles. The
suggestion that tribal self-determination be bolstered with legal significance evokes reactions to “Indian
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separatism” verging on enmity, even when offered by the U.S. President : a U.S. senator angrily
proclaims that “[c]itizens of the [U.S.] should not have their rights limited by separate governments
within the [U.S.]”451 In short, full independence is likely not negotiable, but a significant degree of
political and legal autonomy may be.
In fact, most tribes do not define secession and independent statehood as the desired end-state of
a program of self-determination but rather an intermediate status that would devolve degrees of political
and legal power that has been arrogated to the U.S. and the States and allow tribes to “challenge . . .
intrusions across the full spectrum of locations at which . . . injury is felt.”452 A pragmatic approach,
organized around issue-area autonomy, that would allow Indians to “recuperate” traditional laws and
modalities of governance453 and assert alternative institutional structures more consonant with their
cultural imperatives represents an approach to self-determination that demands a lesser quantum of
independence while departing sufficiently from the current paradigm to satisfy most tribes.454
Under this approach, which might well be implemented by the resumption of the treatymaking
process, the presumption against autonomous tribal self-governance, gradually accreting since the early
19th century,455 would be overturned, and tribes would once more be presumed to possess near-absolute
territorial autonomy complete with the powers to create and enforce laws over all persons within their
jurisdiction in respect to all issue-areas, save for commerce and the dimensions of external sovereignty—
i.e., foreign relations and defense. Where Indian self-determination does not implicate the external
powers of U.S. sovereignty, matters concerning whether and how Indians choose to hunt and fish, to
produce the necessities of life, to raise children, to pass on knowledge to succeeding generations, to create
and enforce law, and to worship ought simply to be of no concern beyond the territorial limits of Indian
jurisdiction. Finally, under the pragmatic program of Indian self-determination, rather than shed their
allegiance to the U.S., individual Indians would, through participation in their own institutions and the
elaboration of their own systems of social regulation and welfare, enjoy an enhanced bicultural identity
while retaining their national identity as U.S. citizens.
In return for accepting external limitations upon their sovereignty, tribes would receive material
support in reconstituting antecedent tribal institutions as well as specific legal guarantees committing the
U.S. to specific undertakings necessary to preserve and protect tribal autonomy. An Omnibus Indian
Rights Act [“OIRA”] and a series of constitutional amendments together constitute the package of legal
reformation necessary to carry these guarantees into force.
2. Omnibus Indian Rights Act
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Four primary reform measures, each centered upon a different functional area, must be completed
to guarantee Indian self-determination: (1) the strengthening of protections of Indian religious and
cultural rights; (2) the creation of specific and enforceable trust-based remedial programs for Indian
beneficiaries; (3) the creation of new judicial institutions committed to resolving ambiguities and
construing treaty terms in favor of tribal reserved rights and to the enforcement of the trust doctrine; and
(4) the incorporation, by implementing legislation, of those principles of international law supportive of
the rights of Indians as indigenous peoples.
With regard to Indian rights, process is at least as important as doctrine. Even if the entire corpus
of caselaw burdening Indian cultural, religious, and property rights were stricken in a single legislative
fiat, failure to alter the process by which laws are made in a democracy that enshrines the principle of
majoritarianism would sow the seeds of future Indian disability in the soil of the newly amended legal
system. Although the precise mechanisms whereby to accomplish Indian participation in the drafting of
legislation trenching in Indian affairs is open to debate, and although mere participation does not preclude
truncation of rights through judicial review, the representation of Indian interests in the U.S. legal process
is essential. Substantively, OIRA might (1) craft explicit statutory exceptions to the Endangered Species
Act for religious-based takings of endangered species, (2) mandate inclusion of Indian representatives in
U.S. delegations to international organizations and quasijudicial bodies with competence over subject
matter that implicates indigenous rights, including, e.g., the International Whaling Commission, the
United Nations Human Rights Commission, and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; and (3)
preempt State laws imposing penalties for religious-based use of controlled substances by including
specific language in AIRFA to exempt Indian religions from State laws. If Indians, as part of their
religious heritage, wish to hunt whales or ingest peyote, it should not be within the power of the States or
of the federal government to interpose their contrary will, and only specific legislative enactments can
sweep away the prohibitions that attach to such practices through laws of general application.
Second, the inclusion of specific trust-based programs within OIRA will free remedial funds from
the strings of dependence. Recent federal block grants to tribes, though they have increased opportunities
for economic development, have all too frequently been accompanied by a maze of regulations that
defeats tribal initiative and substitutes legal accountability for cultural appropriateness.456 A chapter of
OIRA would streamline the grant process, reduce management costs, and liberate future remedial
programs from unnecessary federal oversight. Greater consultation with tribes in the block-granting
process would rationalize expenditures of funds and lead to greater, and more culturally relevant,
economic development. Legislative deconstruction or decomposition of the BIA457 and tribal
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governments, as well as by other measures that restructure U.S. relations with Indian tribes, may be
necessary to carry this element of OIRA into effect in practice.
Third, because U.S. federal courts are precluded, by institutional commitments to the legal
doctrines of stare decisis and the political principles of majoritarianism and separation of powers, from
asserting a principled defense of Indian reserved rights against legislative incursion,459 a new judicial
institution unfettered by such legal and political baggage may be necessary. A separate Court of Indian
Affairs [“CIA”], with a bench populated in part by Indian judges schooled in the history of U.S.-Indian
relations might be a fruitful avenue for further investigation and discussion.460 The CIA might be created
by Congress as an Article III court with appellate jurisdiction to hear cases sounding in federal Indian law
and competence to award restitution of Indian lands and rights. Moreover, to resituate the trust doctrine
on a more stable moral and legal foundation and create judicially enforceable obligations to Indians, cases
concerning breaches of the trust might be heard by the CIA under a grant of original jurisdiction, and the
political question doctrine might be declared inapplicable in respect to Indian claims.461 The trust doctrine
has decayed into a relic of colonialism and paternalism rife with the potential for abuse and dereliction: if
it is to be reimagined as a judicially-enforceable guarantee of Indian welfare, an institutional approach
less captive to majoritarianism than the current system of Article III courts must be introduced.
Corresponding measures to strip doctrinal defenses otherwise available to the U.S. will be necessary;
amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act should also be considered as part of the jurisdictional
provision authorizing the CIA.462 Finally, to assist the CIA in the reformation of the trust doctrine, OIRA
might authorize an Indian Assembly, consisting of representatives from all Indian nations and created
outside the U.S. political and legal framework, to serve as a quasilegislative body that would negotiate
directly with Congress and executive agencies as to broadening the substantive contours of the trust and
developing more robust methods of enforcement.
Further, administrative agencies, particularly those that distribute benefits to tribes, should create
rules that Article I courts, when adjudicating cases affecting Indian rights, appoint a special master fluent
in Indian legal issues to hear the merits. To provide institutional support for this remedial proposal,
OIRA might endow pan-Indian legal organizations, such as the Native American Rights Fund, the
Institute for the Development of Indian Law, and the University of New Mexico Indian Law Program,
with funds to draw additional Indians into the legal profession and thereby enhance the autonomous
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Indian capacity to frame and defend Indian rights and interests in the panoply of U.S. courts.

Similarly,

because the investiture of tribal colleges and charter schools for Indian children with sufficient funds to
allow their expansion, curricular development,464 and maturation is also essential if the next generation of
465

Indian leaders is to develop the legal sophistication necessary to part with non-Indian intermediation,

OIRA might make additional funds available for this purpose. Since passage of the proposed bundle of
legislation will be hotly contested and require political horsetrading, inclusion of language committing the
U.S. to a general process of legislative reform at the outset may suffice.466
Finally, the positive legal reforms proposed in OIRA may be inadequate, standing alone, to
secure to Indians the guarantees of genuine self-determination. In addition, the ongoing normative
process of interpreting federal Indian law, conducted by the political as well as the legal branches of
government, may require reinfusion with the spirit of the medieval ecclesiastical humanism that
“perceived a normative order independent of and higher than the positive law or decisions of temporal
authority” and “provided the jurisprudential grounds . . . to withhold the imprimatur of law from acts of
earthly sovereigns found to violate th[is] moral code.”).467 Accordingly, a conference of jurists, scholars,
and practitioners—assisted by the American Legal Institute—might be convened to restate a corpus of
federal Indian law ameliorated by the influence of this far more humanist tradition. This Restatement of
Federal Indian Law might strike a balance between majoritarianism and moral obligations to afford
justice more favorable to Indians and thereby render a more normatively attractive foundation upon which
to base the future legal and political relationship between the U.S. and Indian tribes.
3. Constitutional Amendments
Even if Indian self-determination is buttressed by a comprehensive OIRA, the project of legal
reformation may be incomplete. Constitutional amendment[s] may be necessary to (1) renounce plenary
power or permit devolutions of power that enhance tribal autonomy and sharply limit the subject matter
and issue-areas in which Congress may treat Indian tribes as domestic dependencies; (2) recognize Indian
property as within the full meaning of the protections of the Fifth Amendment Takings and Just
Compensation clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (3) restore or confirm the status of Indian tribes as
entities superior to the States in the federalist hierarchy.
Precedent exists with the inter-American system for constitutional amendment in recognition of
indigenous rights to self-determination: several American states have expressly adopted constitutional or
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statutory provisions to implement elements of international declarations regarding indigenous peoples.

If plenary power were abridged by constitutional amendment to recognize tribal autonomy in all issueareas save for defense, foreign relations, and the power to regulate commerce with Indian nations—the
sole power constitutionally committed to Congress by the text of the Constitution—arguments for its
retention would be easier, normatively speaking, to marshal. Only by narrowly restricting plenary power
through a constitutional amendment clarifying the limits of the Indian Commerce Clause can the exercise
of Indian rights to religion, culture, economic development, and the creation and application of law be
authoritatively withdrawn from the vagaries of the U.S. political process. It is not inconceivable that
devolution of power to Indian tribes might pave the road to an eventual resumption of treatymaking with
Indian nations and the incorporation of the substantive guarantees of proposed constitutional reforms
within new sacred texts pledging a union of Indian and non-Indian peoples.469
A more radical transformative proposal might shift central administrative authority over tribes
from Congress to UN trusteeship under an Article 73 mandate for the international community to aid nonself-governing Indian tribes in reaquiring their lands and developing their rights to and capacities for selfdetermination.470 Although this measure more directly challenges U.S. authority than a narrowing of the
definition of the Indian Commerce Clause in keeping with the limited textual support for plenary power
offered in the Constitution, precedents support internationalization of domestic trust responsibilities under
similar circumstances.471 The juxtaposition of this internationalization proposal to the proposal to limit
the definition of plenary power might well render the latter more politically palatable.
Second, Indian property is not within the full protection of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution inasmuch as Congress may lawfully take Indian title, provided that title has not been
“recognized” by treaty or statute, without paying compensation.472 An amendment to include the phrase
“nor Indian property, regardless of whether it has been recognized by the United States,” between the
words “private property” and “be taken for public use” in the Fifth Amendment would remove this legal
disability and act as a bulwark against takings and as limitation on the depreciation of Indian resources.
Third, although nothing in the U.S. Constitution mandates that Indian tribes are inferior to State
and federal governments, practice has rendered them so, and a constitutional amendment to specify their
co-equality with, at a minimum, States, would free Indian tribes of the obligation to submit their rights to
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self-determine to hostile State review.473 In recent years the executive branch has verbally supported an
enhanced tribal position in the federalist system,474 but practice has not followed promise. Indian tribes
remain the least powerful in the tripartite system of federal, State, and tribal governments, and moral and
legal obligations arising under the trust doctrine are subject to majoritarian preference at multiple levels
of governance. More expansive reform proposals that would relate Indian tribes to the surrounding States
by altering the current federalist structure, such as a separate Indian legislature with power to veto State
legislation, or the set-aside of seats in Congress for Indian representatives, though perhaps radical
departures from the domain of the politically possible, may merit further consideration if only to
illuminate the reasonableness of more limited measures.
G. Reconciliation
475

“We took an oath not to do anything wrong to each other or to scheme against each other.”

The final stage of JAI theory is distinguished from the preceding stages in that it imposes a duty
not upon the U.S. but upon Indian people. The execution of the first six stages of JAI will “portend
changes in power and wellbeing”476 for some non-Indians, and may well compromise the universalist
approach to conceiving of, promoting, and protecting rights.477 JAI will therefore invite contestation over
its form, pace, and scope.478 However, if the U.S. acknowledges, recognizes responsibility for, and repairs
the gross injustices suffered by Indians over the course of its creation and expansion, JAI obligates
Indians to find it in their hearts and minds to forgive. If the U.S. restores a meaningful measure of land to
Indian tribes and amends its legal and political order to ensure respect for and protection of fundamental
Indian rights to self-determination, a new regime of peace and justice worthy of emulation and export
must be rewarded with the most precious gift Indians can bestow: forgiveness. By forgiving the U.S. and
all its people in a solemn ceremony479 broadcast globally to symbolize the dawn of the new relationship,
Indians will finally be allowed to heal, and all Americans will be released from the chains of history and
freed to forge a better tomorrow. The U.S. and Indian tribes are not only intertwined geographically and
historically, they are interdependent. Indian autonomy and prosperity on the one hand, and U.S.
473
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legitimacy and global leadership on the other, are inseverable, with each a necessary condition for the full
realization of the other.480 Just as the political and economic development of its “domestic dependent
nations” is tied to U.S. leadership of the global political economy, so also is the moral legitimacy of the
U.S. linked to its respect and promotion of the rights of Indians of Indians to self-determine. If U.S.Indian relationships advance on the basis of a recognition of, and respect for, mutual sovereignties, with
disputes resolved not by coercion and domination but by negotiation and harmonization, a new era of just
peace, worthy of emulation and export, will follow.
IV. Conclusion
An unwillingness to grant redress to victims of gross human injustice is perhaps the greatest
source of national delegitimization.481 Failure to do justice festers in the national conscience as “toxic
guilt” that degrades the attractive force of citizenship.482 By initiating intergroup dialogue and denaturing
pernicious group attachments in favor of mutual identification with past tragedies as well as a collective
stake in the future, the process of redress can encourage “a politics of reidentification” in which
relegitimized national citizenship and universal concepts of justice become chief repositors of individual
loyalties and a nation is “born again.”483
Despite its imperfections, the U.S. is an exceptional nation, and the greatest exponent of liberty
the world has ever known. Still, its moral legitimacy has of late been called into question by those,
critical of its recent intervention in Iraq, who accuse the U.S. of attempting to establish global
hegemony484 and undermine human rights.485 Even if one rejects both charges as entirely without merit—
and there is good reason to do so—in its current geopolitical posture the U.S. has drawn upon itself
increased scrutiny of its own record regarding the promotion and protection of rights. Accordingly, failure
to afford the full measure of justice due its indigenous peoples casts a shadow over U.S. foreign relations
and makes it easier for its critics to ask the question, “Why do we invade Iraq to kick it out of Kuwait but
not do justice at home?”486 As we approach the second anniversary of September 11th, the moral coherence
of the nation in the watchful world it so frequently seeks to mould is at stake, and if Indians continue to
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slip through the interstices of law, policy, and convenience, communication of this fact cannot help but
undermine the moral foundations of American authority and power.
However, just as the Japanese Civil Rights Act of 1988 signaled to rivals and detractors that the
U.S. occupied the high moral ground in the long twilight struggle against Communism,487 a serious
commitment to justice on behalf of Indians might remind contemporary critics of the inherent goodness of
the U.S. and legitimate its international leadership. As the renowned scholar of federal Indian law, Felix
Cohen, noted more than a half-century ago, “[t]here is no nation on the face of the earth which has set for
itself so high a standard of dealing with a native aboriginal people as the United States and no nation on
earth that has been more self-critical in seeking to rectify its deviations from those high standards.”488 It is
thus quite opportune that, at a historical moment when these standards have been called into question, the
long-simmering issue of justice for Indians presents a chance to publicly reaffirm our national moral
character.
Still, although reparations talk is all the rage, this discourse does not translate well into the
language in which Indian claims are phrased. Although compensation may well be the proper form
redress should assume in relation to the crime of African American slavery, reparations is ill-suited as a
remedy around which to construct a theory of justice for Indians, not because of the social resistance it
would be likely to engender, but because money simply cannot reach, let alone repair, land theft,
genocide, ethnocide, and, above all, the denial of the fundamental right to self-determination. Only a
committed and holistic program of legal reformation as the capstone in a broader structure of remedies,
including the restoration of Indian lands and the reconciliation between Indian and non-Indian peoples,
can satisfy the preconditions for justice for the original peoples of the U.S.
Existing theories of justice for Indians either whitewash the historical conquest and forced
cession of Indian lands in order to preserve the contemporary entitlements of non-Indians (JAS);
mistakenly commodify former Indian lands, despite the inconsistency of this position with Indian
cosmology, and treat them as already converted to cash paid through remedial trust-based programs
(JAC); or offer land restoration proposals that would inflict grievous injustice upon blameless (if
historically ignorant) non-Indians and catalyze reactionary anti-Indian politics across a much broader
legislative spectrum (JAR). Worse, because these theories have no strategy whereby to dislodge the
impedimenta of federal Indian law and tame the plenary power of Congress, JAS, JAC (essentially an
applied model of reparations), and JAR offer no proposals whereby to assist tribes in reclaiming their
inherent rights of sovereignty and self-governance and no visions for the restoration of harmony and
peace between peoples.
Justice as Indigenism, by boldly declaring that the justice claims of the original inhabitants of the
U.S. deserve priority in the remedial cue, that past injustices against Indians are as deserving of redress as
if they were committed today, that Indians are presumptively entitled to the restoration of their lands and
to the most extensive freedom from interference with their rights to self-determine compatible with the
corresponding rights of non-Indians and the territorial integrity of the U.S., and that the canon of U.S. law
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governing relations with Indians must be fundamentally transformed if justice is to be done, lays out a far
more ambitious project than any existing theory. Whether JAI will find favor beyond the boundaries of
Indian Country is partly a function of the degree to which non-Indians prove willing to revisit and
reconsider the history of U.S.-Indian relations, as well as of the degree to which they will muster the
courage to call into question the policies by which the U.S. acquired territory, distributed land titles,
asserted dominion over Indians, and rationalized this entire process through the instrumentality of law.
There will be those who categorically reject the Indian claim for justice, just as there will be those who
adhere to existing theories as more “fair” or more pragmatic. Still, if propounding a theory of Justice as
Indigenism accomplishes nothing more than to promote a more searching inquiry on the requirements of
justice for Indians, it will have spelled progress, and until that day when they are free once again to selfdetermine on their aboriginal landmass, Indians will continue to vow to endeavor to persevere.489
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